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Foreword
The first years of the new century see the American defense establishment in un-
abashed primacy but facing two serious challenges. The first is the transformation of
the military itself and all of its attendant agencies no longer suited to both the possibil-
ities and the constraints of an era without a peer competitor to set the march. The sec-
ond is how, in a sea of new technologies, to craft a defense industrial base that both
supports a transformed military and adapts to the dominant political and economic
realities of the United States economy now embedded in a global trading system.
The three authors of this Newport Paper offer groundbreaking answers to the second
challenge. Building on a series of unique interviews and refining their work through a
chain of professional briefings, Peter Dombrowski, Eugene Goltz, and Andrew Ross ar-
gue persuasively that the new challenges are less new than predicted by transformation
advocates, that there are perhaps more continuities and “old” interactions in the de-
fense industrial base that produce efficiencies and effectiveness at levels that could not
have been expected. Looking in detail at three sectors—shipbuilding, unmanned vehi-
cles, and systems integration—they find that network-centric warfare requirements
generate a range of defense industry implications but not the need for or the possibility
of a complete overhaul.
Their analysis is impressive in its depth, but also in its reach. They integrate with new
sophistication material drawn from practice and practitioners with cutting-edge
business theory, especially Thomas Christensen’s distinctions between disruptive and
sustaining innovation and his emphasis on the variation in customer-supplier relation-
ships. They are equally adept at the critical analysis of performance metrics, the indus-
trial landscape of the present and future, and the process implications of proposed
policy change.
The results of this research have been circulated among concerned decision makers
over the last year. The Naval War College Press is pleased to bring this landmark work
to the informed, attentive readership of the Newport Papers.
C A T H E R I N E M C A R D L E K E L L E H E R
Editor, Naval War College Press
Executive Summary
Though still adjusting to the end of the Cold War, the defense industry is now con-
fronted with the prospect of military transformation. Since the terrorist attacks on 11
September 2001, many firms have seen business improve in response to the subsequent
large increase in the defense budget. But in the longer run, the defense sector’s military
customers intend to reinvent themselves for a future that may require the acquisition
of unfamiliar weapons and support systems. Joint and service visions of the military
after next raise serious questions that require the attention of the Defense Depart-
ment’s civilian and uniformed leadership and industry executives alike:
• What are the defense industrial implications of military transformation?
• Will military transformation lead to major changes in the composition of the
defense industrial base?
This study employs network-centric warfare, a Navy transformation vision that is being
adopted increasingly in the joint world as a vehicle for exploring the defense industrial
implications of military transformation. We focus on three defense industrial sectors:
shipbuilding, unmanned vehicles, and systems integration.
The transformation to NCW will require both sustaining and disruptive innovation—
that is, innovation that improves performance measured by existing standards and
innovation that defines new quality metrics for defense systems. The dominant type
of innovation needed to support transformation varies across industrial sectors;
some sectors face more sustaining than disruptive innovation, while some sectors
will need more disruptive than sustaining innovation as they supply systems for the
“Navy after Next.”
Military transformation does not entail wholesale defense industrial transformation. In
the systems integrations sector, much of the innovation required to effect network-
centric warfare is likely to be sustaining rather than disruptive. In the parts of the de-
fense industrial base that build platforms, on the other hand, the standards by which
proposals are evaluated for the Navy after Next will be somewhat different than the
standards used in the past. As a result, transformation could significantly change the
industrial landscape of shipbuilding. The unmanned-vehicle sector falls somewhere in
between; because unmanned vehicles have not been acquired in quantity in the past,
their performance metrics are not well established. Existing suppliers of unmanned
vehicles will have a role in the future industry, but some innovative concepts and tech-
nologies may come from nontraditional suppliers, such as start-up firms.
The U.S. Navy bears the responsibility of transforming itself. Internally, it must find
ways to deconflict the needs of the current Navy and the “Next Navy” from the needs
of the Navy after Next if industry is to support its long-term transformation require-
ments. Externally, pervasive organizational and political obstacles to transformation re-
quire that the Navy carefully manage its relationships with Congress and industry.
Recognition that military transformation need not drive existing defense firms out of
business will facilitate that task.
V I I I E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y
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Introduction
Military Transformation and the U.S. Defense Industry
The U.S. military is awash in visions of transformation. There is an array of joint and
service visions of what has become known as the “military after next.”1 The rhetoric, if
not yet the reality, of “revolution”—i.e., the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and,
somewhat less radically, of “transformation”—is ubiquitous. While itself still adjusting
to the end of the Cold War, the defense industry now confronts a customer that intends
to reinvent itself for the future. On the heels of the struggle to consolidate recently
merged assets, trim high debt-equity ratios left over from the 1990s wave of mergers,
and respond to profit pressures from the post–Cold War decline in the defense budget,
executives must deal with the new specter of military transformation.2 While industry
executives focus on the implications of transformation for the future of their firms, de-
fense planners must ask whether the existing defense industrial sector is adequately
prepared to support their visions of the military after next.
Joint Vision 2020, like Joint Vision 2010 preceding it, foresees a military that dominates
the full spectrum of military operations, from low-intensity conflicts to major theater
wars, in new ways. Information superiority is to be the source of “dominant maneu-
ver,” “precision engagement,” “focused logistics,” and “full dimensional protection.”3
The Army’s transformation project, complete with “Vision,” “Force XXI,” and “Army
after Next,” is billed as the most significant change for the service since World War I.
The Army promises to deliver an “Objective Force” that will be responsive, deployable,
agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable.4 The Air Force, which, like the Army,
has belatedly discovered that it must be an expeditionary force,5 promises in its own Vi-
sion 2020 to deliver “Global Vigilance, Reach and Power” by fielding a “full-spectrum”
aerospace force—that is, one designed to control and exploit not only the air but space
as well.6 The proposed force “encompasses aerospace capabilities to find, fix, assess,
track, target, and engage any object of military significance on or above the surface of
the Earth in near real time.”7 As for the Navy, network-centric warfare (NCW), adver-
tised as a vision of warfare for the information age, is to guide, along with SEA POWER 21,
the transformation of today’s Navy into the Navy after Next. Resting upon the “sup-
porting concepts” of information and knowledge advantage, “assured battlespace ac-
cess,” “effects-based operations,” and forward sea-based forces, the Navy’s exploitation
of information technologies is to result in a “shift from platform-centric operations to
Network-Centric Operations.”8
Some have presumed, as it is tempting to do, that the new information-centric forces
and doctrines will lead to a shift in military buying patterns so fundamental as to reor-
der the defense industrial landscape, with information technology firms assuming a
heretofore unknown prominence. These analysts note that military leaders, in their
revolutionary visions, are looking for ways to apply the tremendous advances in com-
mercial information technology, highly visible in the “New Economy” of the 1990s, to
military missions. In this view, because the defense sector’s product cycle cannot keep
pace with commercial information technologies, military transformation is likely to re-
quire defense industrial transformation.
This report, which analyzes the defense industrial implications of military transforma-
tion, takes a somewhat different tack. Drawing on well-known models of innovation,
we develop a new framework that clearly specifies, arguing from core principles, what
types of firms—established defense suppliers, established commercially oriented firms,
or start-ups—are most capable of supporting transformation. Surprisingly, in view of
the obvious technical capabilities of commercial information-technology firms, we
find that current defense-oriented suppliers as a whole are likely to dominate the IT
segment of the future defense market; it is the current defense-focused suppliers of
large platforms (e.g., shipyards) that may be most vulnerable. Such firms are more
likely than IT-oriented systems integrators to face competition from companies that
now sell mostly to commercial customers or foreign navies. We conclude with policy
and organizational recommendations for the military services and acquisition commu-
nity that will help smooth the transformation process in the face of political opposi-
tion, budgetary constraints, and pressures for technological overreach.
The Defense Industrial Implications of Military Transformation
The military’s declared intent to remake itself, and the Bush administration’s oft-stated
commitment to military transformation, pose the prospect of continued post–Cold
War defense industrial disruption.9 While analysts have begun to address the techno-
logical implications of transformation,10 its defense industrial implications have not yet
been systematically examined. Joint and service visions of the military after next raise
serious questions that require the attention of the Defense Department’s civilian and
uniformed leadership and industry executives alike:
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• What are the defense industrial implications of military transformation?
• Does military transformation require defense industrial transformation?
• Are traditional defense suppliers more likely to support a revolutionary or
evolutionary approach to transformation, or will they resist all forms of
transformation?
• Will traditional or nontraditional suppliers prove to be the richest sources of
innovation?
• What kind of relationship between public-sector customers and private-sector
suppliers might best facilitate transformation?
• How can the civilian and military leadership of the Department of Defense ensure
that industry can, and will, support transformation?
If defense planners are serious about effecting military transformation, it is imperative
that these questions receive attention at the outset.11 Transformation is a process. In-
dustry has a critical role to play in that process. Effective implementation of joint and
service transformation visions requires that planners and programmers devote the nec-
essary attention and resources to the technological and industrial dimensions of imple-
mentation. False starts down transformation paths that turn out to be technically or
industrially impractical will prove costly. Time, money, and political capital are scarce
resources. Given the needs for spending on current operations and near-term modern-
ization, front-end transformation requirements and programs need to be carefully
thought out. The sooner that defense planners come to grips with industry’s role in
military transformation, the better.
Plan of Attack
The questions and issues identified here are addressed in the five sections of this report.
First, we identify the key technological trajectories along which the defense industrial
base will have to develop and produce equipment for the Navy after Next by describing
network-centric warfare. Second, we draw upon the literature on innovation to distin-
guish between sustaining and disruptive innovation and to develop a framework for
identifying the types of firms capable of providing transformational goods and services
to the military. Third, we lay the foundation for our analysis of specific defense industrial
sectors by examining the major trends in the contemporary defense industrial landscape.
Fourth, we present case studies of three defense industrial sectors whose products span
the range of transformation requirements: shipbuilding, unmanned vehicles, and systems
integration. We conclude with policy recommendations for ensuring that the relationship
between the Navy (and by extension the military as a whole) and the U.S. defense indus-
try is fruitful during the upcoming period of transformation.
M I L I T A R Y T R A N S F O R M A T I O N 3
The Naval Transformation Case
Network-Centric Warfare
An across-the-board examination of the defense industrial implications of Joint Vision
2020 and Air Force, Army, and Navy visions of transformation would have been un-
manageable. Feasibility and practicality dictated that we narrow the focus of this pro-
ject. That was done in two ways. First, as illustrated in figure 1, we narrowed our focus
from joint and service visions of military transformation generally to naval transfor-
mation specifically. Second, even while exploring the “big picture” defense industrial
implications of military transformation, we focused on three industrial sectors—ship-
building, unmanned vehicles, and systems integration—which, as explained more fully
below, will have a critical role to play in naval transformation.
We use the case of naval transformation, as envisioned in the concept of NCW, as a
means for exploring the defense industrial implications of military transformation.
Network-centric warfare provides an ideal vehicle for our study. NCW is inherently
joint; the Navy cannot implement it in isolation from the other services. At least as
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Project Focus I
much as other service visions, NCW is broadly representative of military transforma-
tion, a naval manifestation of a more general phenomenon. Along with Joint Vision
2020 and the visions of the other services, NCW emphasizes the need to bring the U.S.
military into the information age. NCW envisions that new commercial technologies
are to be applied to military tasks. Information technology is central to the entire
transformation enterprise; frequently characterized as an “IT-RMA,” it enables the re-
alization of such prized capabilities as precision strike and a “common operational pic-
ture.” Using NCW as the visionary touchstone and point of departure, therefore, will
help us understand the defense industrial implications of not only naval transforma-
tion but also military transformation generally. By providing direct links to other ser-
vice transformation visions, the three industrial sectors on which we focus facilitate a
more universally applicable exploration.
The proponents of network-centric warfare portray it as an emerging vision of the fu-
ture of war. That vision is driven by a particular understanding of the transformation
of modern society from the industrial age to a postindustrial, or information, age at
the beginning of the twenty-first century.12 Advances in information technologies that
have resulted in widespread socioeconomic changes will also revolutionize the conduct,
if not the nature, of war.13 In particular, the increasing use of networks for organizing
human activities is touted as a means of reshaping the way American forces train, orga-
nize, arm, and fight.14
In brief, networks harness the power of geographically dispersed nodes (whether per-
sonal computers, delivery trucks, or warships) by linking them together into networks
(such as the World Wide Web) that allow for the extremely rapid, high-volume trans-
mission of digitized data (multimedia). Networking has the potential to increase expo-
nentially the capabilities of individual nodes or groups of nodes and to facilitate the
efficient use of resources. When networked, individual nodes gain access not only to
their own resident capabilities but also, more importantly, to capabilities distributed
across the network. The loss of a networked node need not be crippling; in a robust
network its functions can and will be assumed by other nodes. Since networked nodes
can share information efficiently, they can be designed as simple, low-cost adjuncts to
the network itself.15
Enabling Elements
The U.S. armed forces are developing, initially by serendipity but increasingly by de-
sign, the capabilities necessary for network-centric operations (NCO).16 In a draft of a
capstone concept paper, the Navy Warfare Development Center (NWDC) identified
four NCO “pillars,” or supporting concepts: information and knowledge advantage,
effects-based operations, assured access, and forward sea-based forces (see figure 2).17
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The postulated benefits of NCO provided by the pillars of information and knowledge
advantage18 and by effects-based operations19 (EBO) include speed of command,
self-synchronization, advanced targeting, and greater tactical stability. Netted sensors
are to provide shooters and commanders with “unmatched awareness of the battle-
space.”20 Within the battlespace, warfighters are to be able to “self-synchronize” their
activities to accomplish a commander’s intent by drawing upon a shared “rule set—or
doctrine”21—and a “common operational picture” (COP). In essence, self-synchronization
is accomplished by devolving decision making downward to the lowest appropriate
level, thus allowing warfighters to respond directly and quickly to tactical, operational,
and even strategic challenges. Fires are to be employed for effects-based operations
rather than attrition-based warfare. Precision-guided munitions, in conjunction with
advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities will allow tar-
gets to be hit with greater economy—simultaneously, rather than sequentially—greatly
increasing the possibility of inflicting disproportionate effects, particularly psychologi-
cal, on the adversary. Tactical operations may thus achieve strategic objectives.
Finally, by geographically dispersing sensors, shooters, and their supporting infrastruc-
ture within an overarching network, U.S. forces will be able to achieve greater tactical
stability—a favorable balance between survivability and combat power.22 Fires, rather
than forces, will be massed, and they will be delivered from beyond visual range.
Ideally, EBO, fueled by information and knowledge superiority, will enable U.S. forces
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FIGURE 2
Source: Navy Warfare Development Command, Network-Centric Operations: A Capstone
Concept for Naval Operations in the Information Age, “Executive Summary” (Newport, RI:
Navy Warfare Development Command, draft dated 6/19/01), p. ii.
to “lock in success and lock out enemy solutions” and options.23 Smaller, lighter, faster,
less complex, and less expensive nodes (i.e., platforms) linked by interoperable, highly
redundant, self-healing networks will present adversaries with fewer high-value targets
and improve the robustness of operations against a determined foe.
Implicitly at least, NCO is a joint vision that harnesses capabilities from all services; it
is applicable to warfare on land, air, and sea.24 That NCO is a Navy concept with naval
origins, however, is evident in the two pillars that are distinctly naval: assured access
and forward-deployed sea forces. “Assured access”25 refers to the ability of the U.S.
armed forces to gain entry to and use both overseas infrastructure, such as ports and
airfields, and the battlespace itself, even when confronted with a capable and hostile
adversary.26 No sanctuary is to be ceded to the adversary. It is the job of the Navy and
the Marine Corps to enable and ensure access for follow-on forces from the Air Force
and the Army—the heavier forces necessary to fight and win major regional contingen-
cies. The Navy accomplishes this through the combat capabilities inherent in its forward-
deployed presence assets (i.e., the ability to operate in the littoral).27 Since sea-based
forces “do not rely on permissive access to foreign shore installations that may be with-
drawn or curtailed,” they “furnish an assured infrastructure for additional joint forces.”28
In its Capabilities of the Navy after Next (CNAN) project, NWDC has sought to deter-
mine what technologies, weapons, platforms, and systems the fleet requires to enable it
to conduct NCO. The principal “enabling element” of NCO is a set of information,
sensor, and engagement grids capable of linking all nodes of the network with each
other and with the wider “information backplane”—the World Wide Web and
DoD-specific networks. NCO relies greatly on the development and deployment of
large numbers of capable sensors to populate the sensor grid and provide a COP; sen-
sors are to be ubiquitous. This is not a network but a network of networks, “a global
grid of multiple, interoperable, overlapping sensor, engagement, and command nets.”29
Among existing programs, as illustrated in figure 3, the Cooperative Engagement Capa-
bility (CEC), IT-21, the Radar Modernization Program (RMP), the Web Centric
Anti-Submarine Warfare Net (WeCAN), and the Navy–Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI)
will help the Navy evolve further toward the ability to conduct NCO.30 According to the
NWDC, a critical future step is the deployment of the multitiered—space, air, surface/
ground and undersea—Expeditionary Sensor Grid (ESG), combining, among other
things, invasive sensing systems, unmanned platforms, massively distributed informa-
tion systems, and computer-network attack and defense capabilities.31 At its simplest,
the ESG is a “toolbox of sensors and networks necessary to build . . . real-time battle-
space awareness.”32
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The most robust form of NCW also features smaller, lighter, faster, less complex, and
less expensive platforms (nodes) that will facilitate self-synchronization, swarming tac-
tics, and greater tactical survivability. Prominently featured in this array of innovative
nodes are unmanned vehicles that will deploy sensors throughout the future battle-
space or serve as sensors, communications relays, or weapons platforms. Perhaps the
most significant platform-related question from a naval standpoint is whether NCW
requires such innovative design concepts as small littoral combatants (formerly known
as STREETFIGHTER), fast lift, and small-deck aircraft carriers. Complexity is to reside in
the web rather than in the node; the complex, expensive platform nodes that populate
the traditional, or “legacy” force will be displaced by simpler, less expensive ones. In to-
day’s Navy, existing platforms are being networked via, for instance, CEC and IT-21. In
the future’s network-centric Navy, nodes will be tailored to network requirements from
their earliest conception.
In the spring of 2002, “FORCEnet,” as portrayed in the “Naval Transformation
Roadmap,” emerged as the Navy’s framework for implementing NCW.33 Originally de-
veloped by the CNO’s Strategic Studies Group, FORCEnet is billed variously as putting
the “warfare” in network-centric warfare and as “the next generation of NCW.” It is in-
tended to provide the architecture for integrating NCW components: network systems,
sensors, decision aids, weapons, platforms, people, and infrastructure. FORCEnet is to
conceptually and physically network SEA POWER 21’s capabilities—offensive (Sea
Strike), defensive (Sea Shield), and “persistent presence” (Sea Basing).34 It serves as an
umbrella for existing programs such as NMCI, IT-21, CEC, and NFN (Naval Fires
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The Information Grid—Detailed View
Source: http://spica.or.nps.navy.mil/netusw/CebrowskiNetWar/sld005.htm.
Network) as well as for such major future programs as the Expeditionary Command
and Control, Communications, Computers, and Combat Systems Grid (EC5G) and the
ESG (see figure 4).35 With the promulgation of SEA POWER 21, FORCEnet, and the Na-
val Transformation Roadmap, network-centric concepts have been firmly embedded in
official statements on naval transformation.
NCW and Industry
Our exploration of the defense industrial implications of network-centric warfare fo-
cuses, as illustrated in figure 5, on three defense industrial sectors: shipbuilding, un-
manned vehicles, and systems integration. These sectors were selected for three
reasons. First, they span the network and node components of NCW. Second, the ship-
building sector is unique to the naval case,36 whereas unmanned vehicles and systems
integration are common to joint and service visions. Third, the potential role of com-
mercial information technologies is prominent in all three sectors.
The shipbuilding sector, in its present form or an altered one, will bear the burden of
designing, building, and supporting the transformational naval platforms envisioned
by NCW architects. Unmanned vehicles, unlike naval platforms, are a shared feature of
transformation visions. Aerial, ground/surface, and undersea unmanned vehicles are
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envisioned as network nodes that can be employed as sensor and weapons platforms,
sensor distributors, and as communications relays that connect new and legacy
manned platforms to the network.
Integrating NCW’s nodes or platforms—manned and unmanned, legacy and next gen-
eration—and its envisioned information, sensor, and engagement grids to create a net-
work of networks, or system of systems,37 presents formidable challenges. The most
significant benefits of the network will not be realized unless its myriad components
are designed to optimize their relationship to the network—exporting some functions
to other parts of the network while maintaining the internal capabilities necessary to
self-synchronize and operate in a coordinated, decentralized fashion. Furthermore, the
integration of a system of systems is not only critical for naval transformation but is a
shared transformation requirement. Neither NCW nor Joint Vision 2020 or the other
service visions can be realized without overcoming significant systems-integration
challenges. Transformation’s demanding systems-integration requirements have been
recognized by Kent Kresa, the former chairman of the Northrop Grumman Corpora-
tion: “Before us is a future requiring advanced computer processing power, global net-
works, a wide range of integrated satellite surveillance sensors and a growing inventory
of effective and relatively inexpensive precision munitions powered by precise informa-
tion. . . . But while we know these things will be needed, often we do not know how to
integrate them into a cohesive military force.”38 Similarly, within the Navy, Rear Admiral
Robert G. Sprigg, former Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command, has em-
phasized the challenge of developing an integrated architecture for NCO’s expeditionary
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sensor grid, with its array of space, air, surface/ground, undersea, and cyberspace sen-
sors, “that can handle this merge of thousands of inputs.”39 As our examination of the
systems integration sector will demonstrate, however, there is reason to believe that estab-
lished systems integrators possess the capabilities needed for system of systems integration.
Harnessing information technologies is at the heart of the emerging revolution in mili-
tary affairs and the transformation process that will implement the new visions of war-
fare. Indeed, the emerging revolution in military affairs has been characterized as an
“IT-RMA.” The role of commercial IT in the evolving transformation parallels that of
commercial technologies in the nineteenth century’s industrialization of warfare. The
sources from which the military will draw its revolutionary information technologies
constitute an important aspect of this study’s examination of the shipbuilding, un-
manned vehicle, and systems-integrations sectors.
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Transformation and Innovation
The military’s transformation proposals envision substantial force structure, doctrinal,
and organizational innovations within the services, and technological innovations in
the goods and services that the military purchases from the defense industry. In partic-
ular, the Navy’s preparations to implement network-centric warfare as it constructs the
Navy after Next raise several key questions regarding the relationship between a public-
sector customer apparently intent on transformation and its private-sector suppliers of
goods and services. Is the existing defense industrial base the best source of supply for
the necessary equipment, or will the defense acquisition community need to reach out
to new suppliers? Will existing suppliers have to transform themselves in response to
the requirements for naval transformation? Does transformation require a new rela-
tionship between service customers and industry suppliers?
Former Under Secretary of Defense Pete Aldridge, Jr., has warned industry leaders,
“You all have your work cut out for you.”40 But how disruptive will that work be for in-
dustry? During our meetings with them over the course of this project, private and
public sector defense executives expressed varying views about the defense industrial
implications of military transformation. Although their use of “disruptive” is broader
and somewhat more intuitive than the more narrowly technical sense in which we em-
ploy the term in our discussion of innovation, it is clear that defense industry execu-
tives are attempting to work through the implications of military transformation for
their businesses—and that they do not yet know precisely what those implications are.
When asked whether military transformation requires defense industrial transforma-
tion and whether innovation that is disruptive for the military would be disruptive for
industry as well, their responses spanned the spectrum.
A Raytheon executive responded with an unequivocal “Yes” when asked if military
transformation required industrial transformation.41 One former DoD executive with
responsibility for defense industrial policies stated that industrial transformation and
disruption were inevitable.42 Another former high-level DoD executive, whose portfolio
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included defense industrial issues, argued that transformation will result in defense in-
dustrial restructuring and that industry would resist that restructuring.43 A Northrop
Grumman executive replied that he could tell the story either way; the story he in fact
told was about military transformation absent defense industrial transformation and
about military disruption absent industrial disruption.44 A Boeing analyst argued that
military transformation would be less disruptive for industry than for the military.45
Electric Boat executives boasted that while the military, and particularly the Navy, have
talked about transformation, Electric Boat actually transformed itself during the
1990s.46
Our attempt to address the critical questions with which industry executives and defense
planners alike are grappling begins with a discussion of key concepts from the litera-
ture on innovation. Those concepts help explain the linkages between customer-
supplier relationships and innovation. Essentially, different kinds of innovations tend
to be developed by firms in different relationships with their customers. Military trans-
formation calls for particular types of innovations in each defense industrial sector. We
use innovation theory to explain what kinds of firms within each sector can be ex-
pected to supply the products required to implement transformation. In the subse-
quent sections on the shipbuilding, unmanned vehicles, and systems integration
sectors, we describe the types of innovation that transformation demands of suppliers,
and we consider the likelihood that transformation will require changes in the compo-
sition of the sector.
Sustaining and Disruptive Innovation
In using the literature on innovation, we address a specific, unusual question: can an
established customer-supplier relationship (such as that which exists between the Navy
and the defense industry) generate innovative products? This question is not addressed
by most theories of innovation, military or commercial. Most research emphasizes the
challenges of creating new technological concepts (who thinks of innovations?) and of
adapting organizations to capitalize on new technologies (how do inventions become
usable products?).47 Recent work by Clayton Christensen, however, offers a way to ex-
plore the potential rise and fall of leading firms in the existing supplier base, using the
distinction between sustaining and disruptive innovations.48 The key insight is that
firms with established customer relationships are very good at producing sustaining in-
novations but that those same firms will not be (or are not inclined to be) interested in
disruptive innovations. According to Christensen, disruptive innovations generally re-
quire new suppliers, dealing with new customers.
Sustaining innovations build on familiar product-quality metrics and customer-
supplier relationships—“What all sustaining technologies have in common is that they
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improve the performance of established products along the dimensions of perfor-
mance that mainstream customers in major markets have historically valued.”49 Sus-
taining innovations, no matter how complex, technically radical, or resource intensive,
almost never drive established firms out of business; instead, they tend to reinforce the
success of current suppliers. Expert technical and financial advisors to both suppliers
and customers predict that sustaining innovations will prove feasible, and they under-
stand how to update strategic plans to capitalize on innovation. Customers and suppli-
ers can then cooperate on defining the technical and market requirements to develop
the new product.50 Military transformation is likely to reinforce the role of established
members of the defense industrial base in those sectors in which it demands sustaining
innovations.
Disruptive innovations, on the other hand, often perform less well at first, measured by
the traditional standards, but they introduce new metrics that appeal to a different cus-
tomer base. Of course, not all new technologies that perform poorly qualify as disrup-
tive innovations; they must establish a trajectory of rapid performance improvement
that, building on experience gained in fringe or niche markets, overtakes the perfor-
mance of the old market-leading product on traditional measures of performance.51
Unfortunately, it is especially difficult to predict improvements upon previously unrec-
ognized product attributes. The standard operating procedures of established firms’
strategic planning departments, based on sound models developed by technical and fi-
nancial experts, will tend to weed out highly uncertain investments that hold the po-
tential to yield disruptive innovations. Business strategists fear that new technologies
will develop into “bad performers” in the long run rather than revolutionary products
that fundamentally change the market.52 Existing firms’ biggest customers, with whom
they naturally maintain close relationships, also shun the risk of inferior perfor-
mance.53 Consequently, it is new firms—lacking standard operating procedures or
well-developed customer relationships—that are most likely to invest in disruptive in-
novations. When a start-up firm’s investment succeeds, the industrial landscape is
transformed, as the start-up replaces the pre-innovation market leaders. Military trans-
formation is more likely to result in new suppliers making an appearance in the de-
fense marketplace when it requires disruptive innovation.
Christensen’s analysis of the dynamics of customer-supplier relationships and innova-
tion must be applied with care to the defense sector. Transformation differs from the
usual case in which a customer decides whether to accept or reject an innovation of-
fered by a nontraditional, upstart supplier. After all, in the defense sector, the demand
for transformation and innovation, whether sustaining or disruptive, originates with
the customer. That “demand pull” weakens the usual dynamic in which established
firms decline to participate in disruptive innovations.
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Moreover, the unique characteristics of the defense industry may alter the traditional
entrepreneurial route by which disruptive innovations usually drive established suppli-
ers out of business, because the factors that drive military acquisition decisions are un-
familiar to most business executives. In the commercial world, entrepreneurs and
venture capitalists generally understand the manufacturing, marketing, and ultimately
profit-making rationales of their customers in adopting niche markets early. For the
defense industry, however, customers’ operational concerns depend on military con-
cepts that are alien to most technological entrepreneurs. Defense acquisition projects
require entrepreneurs to understand and exploit unfamiliar, noneconomic strategies in
their business plans. As a result, even in sectors of the defense industry where transfor-
mation introduces new performance metrics—sectors in which the mechanistic appli-
cation of Christensen’s theory would suggest that the established firms are vulnerable
to new entrants—established defense firms may play a crucial role as brokers between
entrepreneurs and military customers. Joint ventures with, or acquisitions of, start-ups
by traditional defense contractors will enable newcomers to translate more readily the
language of military operations in which military doctrine developers express their
professional expertise into technological and industrial requirements.54 Solid relation-
ships between established defense firms and protransformation customers will facili-
tate communication that speeds investment on the new technological trajectory.
The extent to which the existing defense industrial base is positioned to support mili-
tary transformation will vary across sectors of the business. That variation will depend
on the extent to which the innovations required from that sector are sustaining or dis-
ruptive and on the extent to which the existing, trusted relationship between defense
firms and their military customers is necessary to broker the requirements definition
and project management processes.
The Customer Side of Innovation for Transformation
Even though customer resistance to disruptive innovation is reduced in the case of mil-
itary transformation by the customer’s commitment to a vision of future, information-
intensive warfare, some customer resistance remains. The customer-supplier dynamic
here cannot be reduced to either customer comfort with sustaining innovation pro-
vided by established firms or to customer resistance to disruptive innovation offered by
upstart suppliers. Customer resistance in this case is a response not to innovation origi-
nating in industry but to conflict within the military itself about the future of warfare.
The military is not a single, unified customer; each service promotes a different vi-
sion.55 In fact, various communities within individual services (for instance, the Navy’s
three “baronies”—surface, subsurface, and aviation) compete for roles, missions, and
resources. Some services and communities are more committed to transformation than
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others; and the most committed have emerged as, in effect, the functional equivalent of
Christensen’s niche customers, early adopters of potentially disruptive innovations.
These transformation advocates aspire to become the customers for the defense
industry.
The military services develop new doctrines and capabilities in reaction to the chang-
ing strategic environment and to lessons learned from military operations and wars.
Since the early 1990s, civilian and military defense planners have argued that the Cold
War’s end requires a capabilities-based rather than a threat-based approach.56 Military
analysts continue to debate the mechanisms by which the services develop innovative
doctrines and capabilities. Three prominent theories, developed by Barry Posen, Steven
Rosen, and Owen Cote, respectively, suggest that the current uncertainty about the fu-
ture of warfare is a normal stage in the process of military innovation.57
Barry Posen argues that most innovation in military doctrine stems from the actions of
civilian politicians. In response to the changing goals of the state or to changes in the
international political-military environment, civilian leaders revisit the country’s grand
strategy. In time of high external threat, civilian leaders can intervene to disrupt the
standard operating procedures by which the military services would otherwise con-
tinue to invest in training and equipment to serve the previous grand-strategic goals.58
In the context of the contemporary transformation debate, Posen’s theory is exempli-
fied by the Bush administration’s commitment to changing the face of the American
military and by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s very public efforts to reassert
the primacy of the civilian Office of the Secretary of Defense over the uniformed mili-
tary.59 On the other hand, the absence of a traditional security threat to the United
States from a “peer competitor” may allow the civilian national security agenda to be
dominated by pork-barrel concerns that will not drive the services toward long-term
doctrinal innovation. The short-term pressures of the war on terrorism may consume
the civilian (and military) leadership, and prospects for military innovation may fade.
Without doctrinal innovation, pressures for technological innovation in the defense in-
dustry will recede as well.60
In contrast to Posen, with his emphasis on external pressures, Stephen Rosen explains
military innovation by focusing on the internal dynamics of military organizations.
Rosen argues that peacetime military innovations depend on visionary officers who
work steadily to solve problems with existing strategic and operational concepts that
they identify through their expertise and operational experience. Military innovation
succeeds when high-ranking visionaries protect creative junior officers from political
threats and when those junior officers can gain promotion on the basis of their innova-
tive ideas.61 Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski’s vital role in developing the core concepts
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of network-centric warfare looks like an example of Rosen’s innovation mechanism at
work. Furthermore, the establishment of the Navy Warfare Development Command,
now the “organizational home” for thinking about network-centric warfare, may pro-
vide the key institutional support for naval transformation. On the other hand,
Cebrowski’s retirement and appointment as the first director of the Pentagon’s civilian-led
Office of Force Transformation might undercut his ability to protect a protransformation
promotion path within the Navy. Moreover, the increasing involvement of commanders
of the unified regional and functional combatant commands in preparing service acqui-
sition plans and budget proposals is introducing an institutional bias toward current op-
erational concerns rather than toward long-term doctrine development and future
modernization. According to Rosen’s logic, this trend presents a threat to military
transformation.
Owen Cote traces military innovation to inter- and intraservice rivalry for roles and
missions adjudicated by the civilian leadership; his theory envisions a prominent role
for both civilian and military leaders.62 Leaders of warfighting communities—such as,
in the Navy, surface warfare officers, submariners, and aviators, and in the wider
interservice context, Army and Marine infantry officers—gain professional status when
they can offer the National Command Authority the best solutions to particular strate-
gic or operational problems.63 Each community can also offer its military judgment to
discredit competing proposals, and each may draw technical advisors into the process
to support its own proposals or to undercut alternatives. According to Cote’s theory,
the best innovative doctrines are adopted through the traditional American process of
pluralism and open debate.64 In this view, Admiral Cebrowski’s move to the Office of
Force Transformation can be seen as an endorsement of the evolving network-centric
warfare vision by the civilian leadership. Full implementation of the vision, however,
will still require a sustained commitment of resources from political leaders and a will-
ingness to choose among competing military transformation options. And the Office
of Force Transformation would need to be appropriately and fully staffed and given a
role in the development of the Future Years Defense Plan and the Defense Planning
Guidance (and the new Transformation Planning Guidance).
If the United States decides to commit itself to military transformation, through what-
ever process of doctrinal innovation, the resulting vision of future warfare will produce
a new set of equipment requirements. Ultimately, most technological innovation in the
defense industry comes from firms responding to new requirements derived from doc-
trine, although other influences, including the political economy and the political ge-
ography of weapons production, may distort the outcome.65 The requirements for new
defense systems will presume the success of certain technological innovations—some
of which will be sustaining and some of which will be disruptive—that will in turn
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shape the likely future defense industrial landscape. Yet because new military doctrines
depend on certain technological innovations, feedback from expert technical advi-
sors—through contact with civilians, military doctrine development commands, and
military acquisition organizations—should contribute to debates about the future of
warfare.
Future Composition of the Defense Industrial Sector
Combining lessons from the business and military analysis literatures on innovation
gives us a framework for determining which types of firms—established defense con-
tractors, leading commercial information technology firms, or small start-up ven-
tures—will populate each sector of the future defense industry.66 The distinction
between sustaining and disruptive innovation has significant implications for military
transformation generally and for the transition to network-centric warfare specifically.
First, NCW’s requirements for sustaining and disruptive innovation will determine
whether established, traditional defense suppliers or nontraditional suppliers, particu-
larly commercial IT firms and start-ups, are best positioned to support naval transfor-
mation. Since the requirement for sustaining and disruptive innovation appears to vary
across defense industrial sectors, the opportunities for nontraditional suppliers will
vary across sectors as well. Second, because the services’ technical and acquisition orga-
nizations—the defense industry’s key customers—will exert a tremendous influence on
the trajectory of technological change in the defense sector, the management of the
customer-supplier relationship throughout the systems development process will be
central to efforts to prepare the defense industry to implement transformation.
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The Evolving Defense Industrial Landscape
Analyzing the defense industry of today in order to understand the defense industry of
the future is inherently risky. After all, if analysts had sought to discern the contours of
the industrial landscape of the year 2000 using data from 1990, they would have been
wide of the mark. With the Soviet Union yet to collapse and a great deal of uncertainty
remaining over the fate of the transitional countries in Central Europe, few would have
predicted the large decreases in the U.S. defense budget or industry’s struggle to remain
viable in the face of declining markets. That said, doing the opposite—attempting to
peer into the future without assessing the current environment—would be equally
foolhardy. As political economists argue, the future is path dependent; where you are
going depends on where you are and the choices you made in the past.
In this section we lay a foundation for discussing the future of the defense industry,
first discussing how the defense industrial landscape arrived at its current state. We ex-
amine several of the prominent themes present in most studies of the defense indus-
try—consolidation, globalization, and commercial-military integration.
Consolidation
Defense industrial consolidation refers to an ongoing process of mergers and acquisi-
tions that have transformed the defense industrial landscape.67 Consolidation has dra-
matically altered the defense industrial landscape. As Jeffrey Bialos, a former Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Affairs, has pointed out, “What were 33
separate businesses in 1990 are 5 large defense firms today [2000].”68 The number of
separate businesses plunged in many sectors of the defense industry during the 1990s
(see tables 1 and 2). Many of the most famous names in American industry, from
General Motors and Ford to Hughes Aircraft and McDonnell Douglas, have either
left the defense business or exist today only as divisions of larger enterprises. The few
remaining big defense firms generally comprise several formerly independent com-
panies or defenseoriented divisions sold by other companies that have themselves left
the defense business.
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While consolidation has led to the demise of brand names in the defense field, it has
not led to the closing of weapon-system production lines,69 at least not to the extent
forecast by some commentators in the early 1990s. Generally, production capacity re-
mains higher than warranted by existing contracts and projected sales. In effect, the
American taxpayer is paying for more industrial infrastructure than is necessary. The
excess capacity persists for many reasons, but the most significant is that defense firms
can use congressional pressure to maintain low rates of production or to sell goods not
necessarily requested by DoD—earning reliable profits as a politically savvy regulated
public utility does.
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PLATFORM
COMPANIES1
(1990)
COMPANIES1
(2000)
Fixed-wing Aircraft 8 3
Launch Vehicles 6 3
Rotorcraft 4 3
Satellites 8 6
Strategic Missiles 3 2
Submarines 2 2
Surface Ships 8 3
Tactical Missiles 13 3
Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 6 3
Tracked Combat Vehicles 3 2
TABLE 1
U.S. Contractor Presence for Selected Military Platforms (1990–2000)
1 Companies producing platforms in stated year. Not all companies produce all classes of platforms within a given platform area.
Source: Department of Defense, Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress, January 2001. Available at http://
www.acq.osd.mil/ia/congress_reports.html.
PRODUCT AREA
COMPANIES1
(1990)
COMPANIES1
(2000)
Ammunition2 9 9
Electronic Warfare 21 8
Radar 9 6
Undersea Warfare 15 5
Solid Rocket Motors 5 5
Torpedoes 3 2
TABLE 2
U.S. Contractor Presence in Selected Military Product Areas (1990–2000)
1 Companies producing products in stated year. Not all companies produce all classes of products within a given product area.
2 The number of ammunition companies reflects active government-owned assembly and explosive production facilities. DoD is con-
sidering reducing the number of these facilities.
Source: Department of Defense, Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress, January 2001. Available at http://
www.acq.osd.mil/ia/congress_reports.html.
Even after the 1990s consolidation, the largest defense firms are able to maintain multi-
ple “centers of excellence,” allowing them to bid on a wide range of platforms and inte-
gration programs. In most cases, mergers and acquisitions have broadened the new,
larger defense conglomerates’ portfolios of programs, but each of the once separately
owned facilities continues to nurture its own core competencies. Postconsolidation in-
tegration and restructuring at the level of design teams and production facilities is
loose at best. At the same time, by adding military businesses and spinning off com-
mercially oriented facilities, the parent companies in the defense industry have typi-
cally become even more dependent on military customers than the largest defense
firms were in the past.
Consolidation, even if incomplete from an economic perspective, might still have seri-
ous implications for military transformation. Many policy makers believe that less
competition among defense contractors will lead to increased prices, decreased respon-
siveness to the needs of the military, and less innovation. This logic largely tracks with
standard economic theory, but it must be applied to the defense sector with care.
Even in acquisition programs in which multiple suppliers bid for a development or
production contract, political and bureaucratic forces often ensure that competition is
stunted. Weapon system competitions are often not “winner take all” affairs but rather
design competitions in which different firms compete only for the selection of their re-
spective approaches. A prime is selected, but the “losers” share in profitable produc-
tion. In some cases sharing means that each firm builds entire platforms or systems (as
with DDG 51 destroyers); in others it means that losing firms become subcontractors
to the winning firm or team of firms.70 Politicians and industrial-base advocates often
justify such production sharing by arguing that it helps to maintain firms with core
defense-production capacities so that they might bid on future projects. In reality,
shared production results also from the concerns of DoD and Congress about the do-
mestic political impact of closing defense plants—often with little regard for the eco-
nomic cost. The result is that the salutary effect of competition on prices touted by
economic theorists is considerably diluted in the defense industry.
A related criticism of defense industry consolidation—that it may limit the industry’s
propensity to innovate—is tied directly to the implementation of transformation.
When firms invest in innovation, their goal is to create new products and thus poten-
tial new sources of revenue. However, firms are especially interested in products that
are already programmed into the defense budget; because of the up-front investment
required for innovation, defense suppliers are biased toward extending the production
of current systems rather than pushing the technological envelope for new products.
Many critics of consolidation presume that the key motivation to innovate in the
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defense sector comes from industry competition—that it is firms not currently selling
“legacy” systems that will be most motivated to develop new products, in the hope of
replacing established sellers.
Incentives for innovation in the defense market actually differ somewhat from this tra-
ditional economic view, because the military market is a near monopsony, and the mil-
itary customer demands unique products. Even in sectors in which suppliers face
demand from perfectly competitive consumers, the economics literature does not pro-
vide a clear picture of the role of competition in promoting innovation.71 Competition
may provide firms with an incentive to innovate, but it reduces their capability to earn
returns that recoup up-front investment; firms in competitive industries may accord-
ingly invest less in research and development (R&D). In the defense industry, however,
a powerful, single customer directly pays for the initial research and development in-
vestment and sets the agenda for innovation. True consolidation of production lines in
the defense industry may even free resources that the military could use to support ad-
ditional R&D.72
Defense industrial consolidation has been more a Wall Street financial phenomenon
than a Main Street production phenomenon. As such, it will be neither a catalyst of,
nor impediment to, defense industrial support for transformation. Disagreement about
the advantages and disadvantages of continued defense industrial mergers and acquisi-
tions will continue, but consolidation will not have a significant impact on industry’s
role in transformation.
Globalization
Despite the hype,73 defense industrial globalization is more mirage than reality. There
are three dimensions of economic globalization: trade, investment, and technology dif-
fusion. On all three counts, there is reason to doubt that the defense sector will follow
other sectors, such as the automobile industry or machine tools, much less service in-
dustries like banking and transportation, down the road toward globalization. More-
over, even if the defense industry does globalize, there is little reason to believe that
globalization will either facilitate or inhibit military transformation.
There are serious impediments to higher levels of cross-border defense-related trade,
investment, and technology flows. First, impediments to defense exports, from limited
demand to concerns about regional instability and proliferation, are legitimate, how-
ever much the defense industry would like a freer hand to peddle its wares overseas.
Second, cross-border defense industry investments, with some significant exceptions,
often generate security concerns in host-nation governments, including the United
States. Even if the worldwide trend toward reducing regulation and privatizing public
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services continues, most countries will still believe that controlling basic weapons-
production facilities is prudent. Third, advanced military technologies in the United
States and elsewhere are largely the product of public investment; few government offi-
cials want to share the public patrimony even with close allies—much less with coun-
tries that qualify merely as potential allies or “friends.” These limits also apply to firms
that produce dual-use rather than military-unique technologies, as revealed in the im-
broglio over the sale of an American firm, Silicon Valley Group, Inc., to a Dutch firm,
ASM Lithography Holding NV. As news accounts reported, the United States was “con-
cerned that SVG’s lithography technology—used to make lenses for spy satellites and
other high-tech equipment—will be shared by the Dutch firm with potentially hostile
countries such as China.”74
In addition, defense industrial “globalization” is an uneven process. For much of the
world, it consists largely of imports and limited licensing agreements to assemble, and
perhaps produce, lower-end systems and components; there is no requirement for
technology-intensive, transformed forces. In many cases, the potential for globalization
is also constrained by the limited resources available for defense.
The most significant arena of defense industrial globalization (or, more precisely,
“regionalization”) lies within the North Atlantic community. Officially, NATO allies re-
main committed to meeting interoperability problems and equipment shortfalls by
means of a strategy centered on the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). Unofficially,
and at the level of domestic and regional politics, the NATO commitment is less clear.
Most countries want to secure a share of the overall procurement and R&D budgets for
their national industrial “champions.” As a result, even intra-alliance globalization re-
mains limited by traditional political economy concerns and by the low level of Euro-
pean procurement and R&D spending (low, at least, in comparison to U.S. spending).
The European Union has sought to rationalize procurement strategies by allowing for
the consolidation of national champions into supranational regional champions. Thus
EADS, BAE Systems, Thales, and Finmecanica have emerged as the big four producers
of defense equipment in Europe. For the most part, each of these firms is multina-
tional—their research, development, and production facilities are spread across several
European countries and, to a lesser extent, non-European countries, such as the United
States. The four firms are increasingly entangled in a complex web of partnerships, li-
censing agreements, joint ventures, and other forms of collaboration. According to
Mattias Axelson, EADS, BAE Systems, and Thales have “the sales and breadth of capa-
bilities that are comparable to the leading US defence companies and each is based on a
complex network of cross-border ownership structures and joint ventures.”75
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But these European firms and their joint ventures are still bound by agreements to allo-
cate production according to national governments’ levels of investment in projects, se-
verely constraining any changes in business practices or economic efficiencies for
which globalization advocates might hope.76 Ultimately, the combination of political
incentives to protect local markets, concerns about the international spread of classi-
fied information, and intra-alliance tensions over grand strategy keep European firms’
operations in the United States—the aspect of globalization that would be most rele-
vant to implementing military transformation in the United States—are almost fully
independent of their parent companies’ worldwide businesses.77 Facilities located in the
United States, whether owned by Americans or foreign shareholders, are managed for
the benefit of the American market, and they will contribute to military transforma-
tion according to their core competencies and to the demand that doctrinal innovation
sets for the products that they are good at making. Superficial defense industrial glob-
alization will not affect these underlying realities.
Commercial-Military Integration
Throughout the 1990s, political leaders and defense industry analysts called for re-
placement of a defense industrial base separated from commercial industry with a sin-
gle, integrated industrial base that would serve multiple customers.78 Some of them
argued that the integrated industrial base would be necessary to give defense customers
access to more advanced technology under continuous development for commercial
applications.79 Many transformation advocates now argue that a military intent on
transforming itself should turn away from traditional suppliers and toward firms at the
forefront of the “New Economy.” Others suggest that the transition to commercial-
military integration has already taken place.80 That assessment is premature; if anything,
many defense firms have shed commercial divisions and product lines while acquiring
more defense-related capabilities through mergers and acquisitions. Moreover, com-
mercial firms are uninterested in commercial-military integration and thus will not do
a good job of serving the customized defense market for high-end networks and nodes.
Commercial-military integration may have some impact on inexpensive, low-end, sim-
plified acquisition threshold products and on subcomponent purchases, but for the
primary systems under consideration with respect to military transformation, the mili-
tary customer need not and should not rely on commercial-military integration.
Some links between the commercial world and the defense industry have been devel-
oped as a result of DoD’s push to integrate commercial-off-the-shelf technologies
(COTS) into its defense systems as a way to reduce costs, increase capabilities, and
shorten weapons-acquisition and development cycles. Incorporating those subsystems
into military products can help the military avoid technological obsolescence in the
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face of nimble overseas competitors, who might be able to “cherry-pick” the best and
most affordable commercial systems for their own limited defense investments. The
defense acquisition community needs to develop the organizational capability to scan
commercial innovation so that it can choose suitable technologies to integrate into
weapons systems. Practically speaking, that scanning function is one of the services
that DoD can and should purchase from technical advisors, systems integrators, and
prime contractors. Direct contact between the military customer and commercial sup-
pliers is not necessarily required.81
Fortunately, the defense industry is likely to be in a position to play this brokering role,
following a trajectory of sustaining innovation in defense information technology.
Since early in the Cold War, the defense industry has sought to develop high-bandwidth,
secure, jam-resistant communications that combine with sensitive, multispectrum sen-
sors to aid in rapid decision making based on incomplete data under high-stress condi-
tions. Those performance metrics were the hallmarks of the air defense and
antisubmarine warfare missions of the 1950s, and they are likewise the hallmarks of the
future network of networks—at a more sophisticated level of technology.
Commercial information-technology firms that are ready to serve as component sup-
pliers are unlikely to do anything to disrupt that defense industry role. The process of
civil-military integration has not thus far progressed much beyond strategic teaming
arrangements, licensing agreements, and the purchase of COTS subsystems, and the
reasons for limited commercial-military integration are unlikely to change. For exam-
ple, Microsoft has established a small organization for selling software to military cus-
tomers and has begun to enter project teams in military development competitions—
including the teams supplying network infrastructure to the CVN 77 and to the
DD(X). Microsoft’s role, however, is limited. First, in the DD-21 and subsequent
DD(X) competition, Microsoft’s main job was to provide off-the-shelf versions of its
Windows NT operating system. Reportedly, Microsoft has shown almost no interest in
creating specialty products to meet the needs of either its military customer or its
DD-21 partners. Second, and consistent with the first observation, Microsoft’s presence
on the DD-21 team was largely “virtual.” During the project, Microsoft apparently de-
voted only one full-time staff person to the DD-21 project—hardly the approach a
firm would take if it were interested in learning or taking over the defense contracting
business. Compared to Microsoft’s overwhelming volume of profitable sales to myriad
commercial customers, defense acquisition simply does not offer enough potential rev-
enue to command much management and software engineering attention.
Many other practical difficulties inhibit commercial-military integration as well:
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• Government contracting requires specialized competencies that are not usually
found in the commercial IT sector (for example, dealing with Federal Acquisition
Regulations, or FAR).
• Defense contractors’ organizational cultures and personnel are well suited to
keeping the DoD customer happy, while the more informal ways of the IT sector
often produces culture shock in the staid, button-down world of DoD.
• The necessary concern of the military with secrecy, accuracy, and information
assurance—more important than ever in the post–September 11 government-
contracting environment—runs contrary to the instincts of many IT firms.
Recent acquisition reform efforts may make it easier for nontraditional defense suppli-
ers to enter the defense procurement marketplace; time, experience, and the genera-
tional shifts that all organizations will encounter in the coming years will help
overcome the informal barriers to cooperation between the commercial IT world and
the DoD. But the incentives to surmount the barriers will remain weak, because the en-
tire defense budget for S&T, R&D, and procurement represents a relatively small prize
for American industry. As a result, defense firms will continue to guard their core com-
petencies at the level of systems contracting, and commercial IT firms are not likely to
alter their business practices to try to become systems suppliers.
Military transformation begins at the level of a system of systems, and has powerful
follow-on implications for high-level systems development and procurement. Because
commercial-military integration is an issue primarily at lower levels of acquisition, it
need not be a major concern in our examination of the defense industrial implications
of transformation.
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Defense Industrial Sectors
Proponents of network-centric warfare conceptually divide future military capabili-
ties into nodes and networks. Nodes essentially correspond to what have traditionally
been referred to as “platforms”—ships, aircraft, submarines, satellites, and land vehi-
cles of various sorts. Networks refer broadly to the various ways in which platforms
connect with one another to share data and information. Shipbuilding, the first of
the three sectors of the defense industry on which we focus, produces Navy-unique
nodes. Unmanned vehicles (UVs), our second sector case study, serve both as nodes
and network components in network-centric warfare. On one hand, they serve as
platforms—unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) will carry weapons as tradi-
tional strike platforms do, and ISR UVs will carry advanced sensor payloads. On the
other hand, concepts for network-centric operations envision the future employment
of UVs as a means of relaying data/information to far-flung nodes. Finally, in our
third case study, we examine the range of organizations that can provide systems
integration services for network-centric warfare. Designing the complex technical
architecture for network-centric warfare’s system of systems—notably including the
up-front systems engineering required, for example, to optimize use of network
bandwidth and translate doctrinal rules for self-synchronization into technical require-
ments for data sharing—poses formidable challenges for the acquisition bureaucracy
and for the defense industry.
As noted previously, our exploration of the defense industrial implications of naval
transformation in these three sectors is intended to generate insights into the defense
industrial implications of military transformation more generally. The possibility for
innovation in these three critical sectors is a test of industry’s capability to support the
development of the Navy, and military, after next.
Each case study has four parts. We first describe the current industrial landscape for
each sector, listing established performance metrics. We then discuss key performance
metrics required to implement network-centric warfare, as well as the specific
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relationships between firms in the sector and the military customer. Each case study
concludes with an evaluation of the types of firms needed to implement the network-
centric-warfare vision.
Shipbuilding
The champions of network-centric warfare seek not only to ensure that the military af-
ter next is fully networked but also to change the types of platforms (nodes) it will op-
erate. For the U.S. Navy the primary nodes are ships, although it obviously operates
other types of platforms, including aircraft, unattended sensors (e.g., the Sound Sur-
veillance System, or SOSUS), and unmanned aerial vehicles.82 If the implementation of
network-centric warfare requires the acquisition of nodes with performance metrics
that differ substantially from those used for existing ships—that is, if the Navy de-
mands disruptive innovation from its platform suppliers—the industrial landscape of
the shipbuilding industry may change substantially, as will the Navy communities most
closely linked to ships (the surface and subsurface warfare communities and the Naval
Sea Systems Command, or NAVSEA). However, many of the innovations that are pro-
posed for ships are sustaining rather than disruptive; ignoring the value of the cus-
tomer relationship between established shipyards and the Navy might unnecessarily
inhibit transformation. While the shipbuilding sector is likely to be substantially
changed by military transformation, with new players entering the competitive mix,
our analysis concludes that the current “Big Six” shipyards—Avondale, Bath Ironworks,
Electric Boat, Ingalls, NASSCO, and Newport News Shipyards—have crucial competen-
cies for transformation themselves. Transformation advocates should not be quick to
abandon the skills and capabilities built up in the past.
Many NCW advocates expect a major shakeup of both NAVSEA—the Navy systems
command responsible for acquiring ships—and the shipbuilding industry. They foresee
Navy acquisition from outside the traditional defense industry, including domestic
yards other than the Big Six, and international yards. They also foresee letting prime
contracts for ships to “systems integrators,” notably leading aerospace and electronics
firms, rather than shipyards.
Network-centric warfare proponents argue that the Navy needs to purchase larger
numbers of smaller, faster, stealthier, more lightly manned ships—in short, ships that
look and perform differently from those in today’s Navy. They believe that larger num-
bers of such ships promise both tactical and strategic benefits. Moreover, given the
continued strategic requirement for expeditionary forces, next-generation warships
must be able to operate close to shore in the littoral against regional adversaries prac-
ticing access-denial strategies. Future navy ships are also defined by what they will not
be—they will not be the large, expensive, multipurpose, multimission ships that the
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United States has built historically. Next-generation warships may well be modular.
Ship designs should allow the Navy to deploy different mission packages on the same
basic platforms, from antisubmarine warfare (ASW) suites to deep-strike configura-
tions, depending on particular mission requirements. Of the major components of the
DD(X) family of ships—destroyers, cruisers, and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)83—it
is the latter that appears to fit most closely with the vision of NCW transformation. As
Vice Admiral Mullen has said,
They are less expensive so you can put these out in numbers and they are modular [in
their mission systems]. In one area I could load up the ASW module on a handful of
these and really go and attack that problem along with the rest of the architecture. If I
have a mine problem, it’s the same thing. So that will be a major mover for us in terms
of not just getting into the ring, but staying in the ring. They [LCSs] have got to be fast,
lethal, stealthy, and they have to be there in numbers. . . . LCS is not defined by size
yet[,] . . . but it needs to be able to pack some punch and it needs to be able to stay.84
Vice Admiral Mullen’s characterization of LCS requirements illustrates the perfor-
mance metrics that NCW advocates hope to apply to future ship acquisition.85 These
analysts question whether the established shipyards are ready to push forward to meet
the technical requirements of LCS and other network-centric platforms.
Our analysis in this section draws on Christensen’s discussion of sustaining and dis-
ruptive innovation and customer-supplier relationships to examine the hypothesis that
military transformation will require transformation of the shipbuilding sector as well.
We consider the performance metrics associated with NCW-inspired ships and the re-
lationship between the Navy and the shipbuilding sector. The performance characteris-
tics of NCW platforms may require some disruptive innovations along with some
sustaining ones; consequently, the industrial landscape of the shipbuilding sector may
well be the part of the defense industrial base that is most changed by military trans-
formation. On the other hand, the need for a close, familiar relationship between buy-
ers with professional military expertise and sellers with technological expertise is likely
to preserve important platform-integration business for the established Big Six military-
oriented shipyards. We conclude that while the adoption of NCW principles may allow
different firms to compete with traditional naval shipbuilders, the established firms
will remain vital to the success of plans for building the Navy after Next.
The Shipbuilding Sector Today and Tomorrow
At first glance, shipbuilding, one of the oldest industries in the world, is a prime example
of an “old economy” industry that has been, or is being, eclipsed in the postindustrial, in-
formation age. Initial impressions are often off the mark. Shipbuilding may well be an
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example of the emerging “new old economy,” where traditional extractive and metal-
bending industries are being transformed and reinvigorated by the information econ-
omy.86 With the introduction of new design and production possibilities, old-economy
industrial sectors outside the defense industry have begun to offer broad arrays of
near-custom products manufactured using techniques that spread fixed costs more
widely and hence reduce consumer prices. Distribution networks are also improving.
The impact of “new old economy” dynamics may be more limited in the U.S. ship-
building industry, however, than in other old-economy industrial sectors. Naval ship-
builders are constrained by a number of factors from making the technological
investments necessary to benefit from the new-old economy dynamic. Given the nature
of their relationship with their primary customer, the U.S. Navy, naval shipbuilders of-
ten have little incentive to invest in cutting-edge R&D and production technologies.
Customer-funded investments are typically closely tied to “stovepiped” program offices
whose accounting rules make it difficult to share process improvement investments
across products. Profit margins are low, especially in comparison with other industries.
As a result, shareholders are relatively intolerant of infrastructure and manufacturing
process investments. With the Navy buying fewer and fewer ships, shipbuilders have lit-
tle hope of realizing returns on up-front technological investments during long,
high-volume production runs. In one shipyard, for example, a robotic welder that was
purchased as part of a move to more flexible, automated production is almost never
used; the cost of programming the machine for specific parts has proven prohibitive,
because it would be used only on “onesies and twosies.”87 The combination of new-old
economy dynamics and transformation requirements, however, may yet transform the
naval shipbuilding industry. Expansion of the fleet to include more and smaller ships
as envisioned by the advocates of network-centric warfare would help justify the infor-
mation technology investments that would enable shipbuilders to capture the advan-
tages of flexible design and manufacturing.
The landscape of the naval shipbuilding sector reflects that of the broader defense in-
dustrial landscape. This sector too has experienced considerable consolidation since
the end of the cold war. Until 1995, the Big Six shipyards—Avondale, Bath Ironworks,
Electric Boat, Ingalls, NASSCO, and Newport News Shipyards—were owned by six dif-
ferent firms. With the acquisition of the Newport News Shipyard by Northrop
Grumman in 2001, the six yards are now owned by a grand total of just two firms.
Ingalls and Avondale had already, by 2001, become part of Northrop Grumman as a re-
sult of its acquisition of Litton. General Dynamics (GD) owns Electric Boat, Bath, and
NASSCO.88 The major American shipyards are listed in table 3.
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Shipbuilders have been even less likely to close production lines than other defense
firms. Instead, facilities have been downsized, workforces have been reduced, and
production schedules have been stretched out to keep yards open and operating even
during the lean times. As a result, there is significant overcapacity in the naval ship-
building industry.
Despite the propensity to keep shipyards open, the declining number of military ships
built each year and the paucity of commercial work has resulted in the precipitous de-
cline of the naval shipbuilding industry. Each of the Big Six shipyards is underutilized.
Second-tier shipyards, whether building for the Navy or for the commercial sector,
generally are equally unhealthy—and even less competitive. Most American shipyards
not involved in naval work are not internationally competitive and rely heavily on
commercial orders that would not exist without the protectionist Jones Act, which
mandates that U.S. coastal trade be carried in American-built ships.89 High labor costs,
the need for recapitalization, financial market indifference, and heavy subsidies to
overseas competitors by their governments plague the industry. This weakness makes it
difficult to imagine that shipyards outside the Big Six will enter the naval market in re-
sponse to transformation.
The prospects for innovation in the shipbuilding industry, however, are not necessarily
as bleak as they might appear. If the Navy clearly signals that it values innovation, firms
will work hard to develop the most innovative ships possible. They can be expected to
search the commercial world for new concepts, technologies, and materials to satisfy
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Alabama Shipyard, Inc. Intermarine Savannah
AMFELS, Inc. Kvaerner Philadelphia Shipyard, Inc.
Atlantic Dry Dock Corporation Marinette Marine Corporation
Bath Iron Works Corporation* Metro Machine of Pennsylvania
Baltimore Marine Industries, Inc. Newpark Shipbuilding
Bay Shipbuilding Company Newport News Shipbuilding*
Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Company National Steel & Shipbuilding Company*
Electric Boat Corporation* Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, Avondale Operations*
Fraser Shipyards, Inc. Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, Ingalls Operations*
Friede Goldman Offshore, East Portland Ship Yard
Gunderson, Inc. Tampa Bay Shipbuilding and Repair
Halter Moss Point Todd Pacific Shipyards Corporation
Halter Pascagoula United Marine Port Arthur Shipyard
*The “Big Six”
TABLE 3
Major U.S. Private Shipbuilding Facilities—2001
As defined by MARAD. Includes both active shipbuilding yards and shipyards with build positions. Derived from data provided in Mar-
itime Administration, Report on Survey of U.S. Shipbuilding and Repair Facilities—2001 (Washington, DC: Maritime Administration,
U.S. Department of Transportation, December 2001), pp. 23–28.
their customer, and to use their in-house resources to push technological boundaries.
They will innovate with an eye toward the approaches taken by their competitors, who
are themselves seeking to please the customer with their own strategies.
Yet left to its own devices, the shipbuilding industry is more likely to embrace sustain-
ing rather than disruptive innovation. General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman are
already encouraging the Navy to invest in incremental changes to existing designs
rather than “clean sheet” redesigns. Electric Boat’s proposals for a next-generation at-
tack submarine are clearly modifications of the current Virginia (SSN 774) class. New-
port News Shipbuilding did not resist the U.S. Navy’s decision to abandon the
clean-sheet approach to what was first CVX and then CVNX.90 Evolutionary improve-
ments in the performance of familiar products reinforce barriers to entry and allow es-
tablished firms to entrench their technological advantages.
NCW and Shipbuilding: New Performance Metrics?
The most contentious part of the debate about network-centric warfare has concerned
its implications for the types of ships that Congress should buy, the Navy should plan
for, and the shipbuilding industry should build. At their most extreme, transformation
advocates argue that traditional major combatants—from big-deck, nuclear-powered
aircraft carriers to extremely capable, multirole Arleigh Burke–class destroyers—will
not have a place in the Navy after Next. Of course, their position must be tempered by
the reality that the Navy will not immediately replace all legacy ships with new ones;
even a high rate of peacetime procurement would buy only a few ships per yard per
year.91 Serious current proposals plan first to demonstrate the characteristics of a network-
centric force using a relatively small portion of the total fleet.
The bitterest arguments today concern the statements of requirements that will define
the new ship designs—the performance metrics by which competing proposals from
the shipyards will be evaluated. If the requirements that carry the day are enhance-
ments of traditional performance metrics—to be executed by new platforms—tradi-
tional shipyards will be well positioned to develop the Navy after Next. If instead the
new design requirements use new performance metrics, the change in customer re-
quirements will likely require the acquisition community to find new suppliers.
As even a cursory review of its current fleet reveals, the U.S. Navy has long preferred
large, multimission, complex, and consequently expensive, naval platforms. Military
leaders naturally want to overawe all actual or potential adversaries with the most ca-
pable ships that can be designed. At the same time, political incentives have pushed the
Navy toward smaller numbers of larger, more capable (and even more expensive) ships
rather than larger numbers of smaller, less-capable (and less expensive) ones.92 When
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faced with high cost estimates for new platforms—estimates reflecting real technologi-
cal uncertainty that might undermine political support for acquisition programs—
advocates naturally promise that their favored innovations can help with additional
missions. That response to political uncertainty yields a kind of mission or capabilities
“creep” that in turn produces complex, high-performance, multirole platforms.93
The Big Six shipyards have convincingly demonstrated their ability to build those
high-end ships. Indeed, that is why they are the “Big Six.” Their capabilities are unsur-
passed. Multirole ships require the complex integration of subsystems within relatively
large hulls, requiring the shipyards to develop particular core competencies. For exam-
ple, the hulls of the Arleigh Burke destroyers are the size of those of traditional cruisers.
Individual ships of that class are intended to fight antisubmarine and antiair warfare
battles at the same time as they prepare for (and perhaps execute) land attack/strike
missions. The result is that the design bristles with antennas, squeezes an enormous
amount of equipment into a confined space, and relies on weapon systems (like vertical
launch tubes) that can handle many types of missiles. The core competencies in naval
architecture and complex craftsmanship that make the Arleigh Burke–class ships tre-
mendously capable are evident as well in the construction of aircraft carriers, amphibi-
ous ships, attack submarines, and even combat-support ships.
Advocates of network-centric warfare emphasize a number of features of future plat-
forms that they argue are substantially different from those of the legacy force. Some of
the performance metrics for evaluating competing designs of STREETFIGHTERs, (the
notional small combatants favored initially by Vice Admiral Cebrowski), the LCS, and
other possible future ships are actually traditional ones—meaning that the designs will
require sustaining rather than disruptive innovations. Other transformation objectives,
however, establish new performance metrics, and some of the resulting ships will cer-
tainly perform less well than legacy ships in terms of traditional standards. As a result,
the network-centric Navy may require disruptive innovation in the shipbuilding sector
and thus the establishment of some new industrial arrangements.
Speed. Transformation advocates emphasize speed. Increased speed is supposed to be
achieved through, among other things, the development of new propulsion systems
and the introduction of new hull forms.94 Yet speed per se does not represent a new
goal for shipbuilders. Throughout much of naval history, speed has been at a premium.
Speed has always helped warships make passages more rapidly, outrun more powerful
pursuers, get within engagement range of evasive targets, and outmaneuver adversaries.
In recent decades, with the advent of missiles and the increased power of naval avia-
tion, speed became less important than when ships exchanged gun salvos. That may
change in the future, due to the increased importance envisioned for speed in the
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traditional matrix of trade-offs between speed and payload. In NCW, increased speed
may help warships to “swarm,” and intratheater transports to reach the battlespace
more quickly, from over the horizon. By implication, NCW proponents may be willing
to tolerate reduced weapon payloads, because, for example, strike weapons are now
more lethal and more accurate. Alternately, if ground forces are less heavily equipped
because their lethality arises from their connectivity to air, sea, and space-based as-
sets—including large numbers and different types of weapons—intratheater transports
might reasonably sacrifice lift capacity for speed. Note, however, that in neither of these
examples is the metric of speed different from the metric used in previous periods;
rather it is the use to which speed is put that is different.
Investment decision makers at traditional military-oriented shipyards will understand
how to evaluate technological proposals that promise to yield faster ships. Customer
demand for more speed calls for sustaining rather than disruptive innovation.
Stealth. Transformation advocates often discuss the availability of new technologies
that promise to reduce the sensor signature of American platforms, including the use
of composites to decrease shipboard emissions.95 Information dominance requires im-
proved sensors that will reveal enemy positions, but it also requires that friendly forces
remain hidden from enemy sensors.
Again, however, stealth is a well-established performance metric for existing naval ship-
yards. Since the introduction of long-range antiship missiles that could threaten ships,
low signatures (in addition to improved electronic countermeasures) have been crucial
for preventing enemy target acquisition and increasing the difficulty of terminal guid-
ance for enemy weapons. Submariners have long emphasized their advantage as “the si-
lent service.” In sum, the difference in the emphasis on stealth by today’s fleet and by
the next generation of warships is largely a matter of degree. Improved stealth will be
the result of sustaining rather than disruptive innovation.
Engagement Range. Network-centric warfare advocates stress that the Navy must be
able to meet future American strategic requirements for deep attacks against targets in
access-constrained environments. In this view, naval forces must be able to mount ef-
fective attacks even when land bases (at less than prohibitive distances) are unavailable
or when adversaries’ attacks on fixed bases raise unacceptably the cost of close-in oper-
ations from them. Naval forces will enable follow-on forces or even halt adversary op-
erations directly, while standing off from hostile forces.
Over-the-horizon targeting became an important naval mission with the first carrier
air strikes, but it became particularly important with the advent in the 1970s of
long-range antiship cruise missiles and the need for stand-off defense of battle groups
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from such weapons.96 The Navy has long depended on communication and fusion of
data from independent sensors and on weapons’ internal terminal-guidance systems.
The precision strikes from the sea against land-based targets for which network-centric
warfare advocates call depend even more on the integration into fleet doctrine and
equipment of new sources of targeting data and of weapons with improved terminal
guidance. The performance metric for the products that they want to buy, however, is
one that has existed for some thirty years.
The primary constraint on land attack from the sea has been the volume of long-range
fires available. The transformation to effects-based operations and to one-shot/one-kill
capabilities based on improvements in weapon accuracy, sensor resolution, and battle
management speed may improve naval strike by reducing the dependence on massed
fires. To this end, the DD(X) program promises (as did DD-21) new guns with longer
ranges, supplemented by extended-range guided munitions, that have increased the ca-
pability to sustain precise fires.
Improved deep-strike capabilities based on new types of guns and missile systems (and
their associated ISR and targeting systems) are unlikely to require new performance
metrics; they simply sustain and improve existing competencies.
Battle Group Cooperation. In network-centric operations, ships will be deployed in
relatively large numbers; “swarming” and “self-synchronization” based on shared access
to data from sensors (both those organic to the Navy and those controlled by other ser-
vices and agencies) will make operational coordination an emergent property of de-
centralized decision making by individual ship commanding officers. The LCS, for
example, is intended to operate this way.97
Buying ships with the ability to operate with other ships in the battle group—especially
in relatively close proximity—has been an important acquisition criterion for many
years. With the development of the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), efforts
to improve awareness of incoming air tracks and improve cuing of the battle group’s
responding fires led to a major investment in high-speed, intership networking equip-
ment. The idea that ships should fight together to maximize their effectiveness is well
established.
Requirements for basic communications interoperability have forced platform design-
ers and operators to cooperate with external groups—designers of other platforms that
will serve in the same battle groups. Unfortunately, organizational boundaries have
been a problem; interoperability requirements are often among the first to be sacrificed
during the development process, and operators are forever asking fleet-support engi-
neers and technicians for “quick fixes” before platforms go to sea together. If the
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organizational problems can be solved, calls for a common operational picture will be
simply continuations of long-term demands for reducing the fog of war and improving
interoperability. New and improved data-sharing may reduce the dependence on active
command and control (a development that could completely reshape the Navy’s opera-
tions and command structure), but new equipment to make that change possible will
advance along a well-known path—it will be a sustaining innovation. However, the in-
creased emphasis that battle group cooperation receives in connection with transfor-
mation will require adjustment on the part of shipbuilders and firms providing
shipboard subsystems.
Affordability. In the face of continued budgetary constraints, the requirement for
larger numbers of ships dictates that new platforms be less expensive than legacy de-
signs. Even with the defense budget increases following September 11, the naval ship-
building procurement account is unlikely to grow enough in the coming years to buy
dozens of ships at current prices; even relatively simple warships currently cost more
than half a billion dollars.
Acquisition-reform advocates have routinely tried, and routinely failed, to make cost an
important performance metric for the defense industry. Buyers naturally prefer lower
prices for any given capability; that was true even during the Cold War, when the press-
ing threat from the Soviet Union drove military requirements. Nonetheless, the acqui-
sition community weighted combat performance higher than low cost in trade-off
studies—for good reason. In the post–Cold War environment, despite the introduction
of “cost as an independent variable” in acquisition regulations, the buyer continues to
weight nonprice performance concerns highly in acquisition decision making; “pork
barrel” politics are important in the low-threat environment.98 Network-centric warfare
may add military pressure to budget pressure for making affordability an important
performance metric, but political resistance will continue. Traditional shipyards may
have some incentive to adapt their designs to the goal of cost reduction, but the politi-
cal safety valve will limit the likelihood that affordability will force major change in the
industrial landscape.
Indeed, recent reports suggest that early plans for the Littoral Combat Ship may have
difficulty meeting affordability criteria. The Navy’s surface warfare directorate esti-
mates that the first LCS will be procured in fiscal year 2005 at approximately $542 mil-
lion per copy—including development costs.99 Although this figure is lower than
similar estimates for the DD-21 and the DD(X) family, it still seems too large to allow
the procurement of numbers sufficient for swarming or for satisfying peacetime forward-
presence requirements with smaller, cheaper ships.
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Low cost has not been a traditional performance metric for the Big Six shipyards, and
the requirements pressures that are driving up the cost estimates for LCS may show
that the Big Six’s investments in other core competencies may continue to be rewarded.
However, if network-centric warfare advocates truly have their way, affordability may
require disruptive innovations from the shipbuilding sector. Based on past sales of frig-
ates and corvettes to foreign navies, some non–Big Six shipbuilders claim that they can
make STREETFIGHTER-like ships for around $250 million a copy.100 If demand for
swarms of ships makes affordability truly crucial for the acquisition community, then
these nontraditional suppliers may have an opportunity to break into the U.S. Navy
market.
Single-Purpose Ships. Network-centric warfare advocates call for single-purpose ships,
in part to eliminate the problem of “tactical instability.” Some analysts argue that battle
groups and amphibious ready groups are tactically unstable today in that the loss of
one large, multimission platform would not only severely cripple the fleet’s capabilities
but be prohibitively expensive in terms of lives and resources. The high cost to U.S.
forces of losing a ship provides potential adversaries a weakness to exploit and a tech-
nological aim-point—cheap weapons capable of knocking out a major American
combatant.
A less complex ship might be optimized for a single mission, such as antisubmarine
warfare. Losses of one or more single-mission ships, while costly, would not weaken the
fleet’s ability to perform its myriad of other assigned tasks. Moreover, at least in theory,
a single-mission ship could be optimized to perform a particular task better than a
multipurpose ship that must compromise among the performance metrics associated
with different missions.
Whether buying single-purpose ships would require disruptive innovation from the
shipbuilding sector depends on what other changes in platform requirements are
adopted simultaneously by the Navy. Over the past several decades, the Big Six have
learned to handle the complicated engineering and manufacturing necessary to fit the
many complex subsystems required for multirole ships into tight spaces; as the Arleigh
Burkes show, even a large hull can be space constrained if you wedge enough equip-
ment into it. “Tight packing” of subsystems is a performance metric associated with
multipurpose ships. Even if a dedicated, single-purpose system achieves a performance
advantage relative to the comparable component of a compromise-limited, multi-
purpose system in part by being larger (with more computing power, cooling capacity,
etc.), the total mission package of a single-purpose ship will be smaller, because it re-
quires less functionality. Consequently, successful proposals for network-centric ships
might perform less well on the “tight packing” performance metric, making the Big Six
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shipyards less likely to offer such proposals. Nontraditional suppliers might have an ad-
vantage in design competitions for relatively large single-purpose ships (yet still
smaller than legacy types), because they have not invested in a core competency in
complex naval architecture.
On the other hand, Navy doctrine writers may decide that single-purpose ships should
be much smaller—not simply for the sake of being smaller but because of the effects of
size upon signature, cost, or deployment schedule, for example—than existing
multirole designs, consistent with the new-economy theme of miniaturization and
with the demand for stealth. If so, the ratio of mission-system size and complexity to
the hull size may not change; it may even increase. That version of transformation
could reinforce the value of traditional shipyards’ skills—making the shift to single-
purpose ships call for sustaining rather than disruptive innovation.
Taking network-centric warfare to an extreme can highlight the potential for single-
purpose ships to require either sustaining or disruptive innovation. Carried to its logi-
cal conclusion, combining single-purpose ships with enhanced battle group
cooperation might increase the demand for disruptive innovation in the shipbuilding
sector still further.101 Ultimately, in a networked Navy, ships need not have many
on-board capabilities, because they can distribute requests for, say, air defense to other
nodes in the network.102 NCW advocates stress that decentralization of capabilities of-
fers benefits to the fleet; a particular node may be lost, but the overall network will re-
main highly capable. Conversely, however, if an individual ship must engage the enemy
without access to the network—whether because of battle damage, enemy jamming,
equipment failure, or unexpected dispersal of friendly units—it will be less capable than
a non-NCW platform. If shipbuilders, both the yards themselves and integrators charged
with populating hulls with various ship systems, need to reorient to make network-only
ships, the key performance metrics will obviously shift dramatically—notably toward
making sure that ships are never cut off from their battle groups.103 The established ship-
yards may be reluctant to propose designs using the new performance metrics, opening
the way for transformation of the industrial landscape.
If, on the other hand, shipbuilders are expected to produce ships with the full panoply
of capabilities to fight independently, with network-based capabilities simply overlaid,
NCW will require sustaining innovation, and the Big Six yards will be likely to main-
tain their dominance. The latter scenario—a less extreme version of NCW—is likely to
be selected on grounds both military-operational (commanders prefer maximally ca-
pable ships under all possible fighting conditions) and political (politicians are unlikely
to vote for ship designs that offer anything less than maximum protection of the Amer-
ican flag and of sailors serving on them). That consideration limits the likely extent of
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disruptive innovation associated with network-centric warfare and its emphasis on single-
purpose ships.
Modularity. Modularity is perhaps the most controversial performance metric sug-
gested by Navy transformation advocates. Ideally, new NCW ships could be optimized
for missions in one environment and then rapidly reconfigured for other missions in
other environments.104 In the starkest possible terms, NCW proponents argue that the
Navy needs to be able to “plug and play”—to “plug in” different payloads (dependent
upon specific mission requirements and battle group composition) and continue
“playing.”
A less ambitious version of modularity applies only to construction; single-purpose
ships built for strike, antiair warfare (AAW), ASW, or reconnaissance, for example,
would share a basic design with many common parts, thereby achieving economies of
scale in production. Modularity, then, might be seen as a component of the new em-
phasis on affordability as a performance metric for shipbuilding, providing that issues
such as overhead costs of supporting modularity can be worked out. While this form
of modularity would surely yield scale economies and help relieve the shipbuilding sec-
tor of some of the burdens of low-rate craft production, it would also add tremendous
complexity and cost in the ship-design stage. The resulting ships would gain whatever
tactical stability benefits the single-purpose performance metric will provide, but they
would also require exactly the kind of demanding naval architecture and construction
skills that the Big Six shipyards and the leading naval design and professional service
consultancies (like SYNTEK and Vail Research & Technology, from the Arsenal Ship
program) have nurtured. From an industrial-landscape perspective, this form of mod-
ularity could actually reduce the disruptiveness of the innovations required by
transformation.
Reduced Manning. Advocates of naval transformation frequently stress the need to
build ships that smaller crews can operate and fight—to reduce costs, ease problems
with recruitment, and put fewer lives at risk during combat. Over the life of a ship, per-
sonnel costs loom large compared to those of design and production. Moreover, as sal-
aries have risen in an attempt to meet recruitment and retention challenges, the failure
to maximize the productivity of human capital aboard ships has become more appar-
ent. Finally, as we will see with UAVs, one of the defining characteristics of NCW
nodes/platforms is that they provide greater tactical survivability and risk fewer lives.
In the shipbuilding sector, reduced manning was not a priority in the past; if anything,
ship designers were pressured in the opposite direction. Warships were and are de-
signed and produced to accommodate a built-in surplus of personnel—to operate
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weapons that in peacetime operations are seldom used and to provide greater damage
control capability. The developmental Advanced Gun System, for the DD(X), is the
first to take personnel out of the magazine. Crew allocations are also changing now, as
certain functions are moved off-ship by applying advances in telecommunications and
computing. These changes may flow into future overall ship designs as part of transfor-
mation—possibly introducing a new performance metric and therefore a demand for
disruptive innovations.
Commercial vessels have long operated at lower manning levels than naval ships.105 It
may be that firms with more experience building commercial ships, even smaller and
much less complex vessels than warships, have core competencies in areas like auto-
mated damage control and shiphandling. These skills may prove advantageous in de-
sign competitions for the LCS and future NCW-friendly ship programs, helping new
entrants establish positions in the market for U.S. Navy ships.
The list of performance metrics for ships touted by advocates of network-centric war-
fare includes a mixture of established and new standards for evaluating designs. Speed,
stealth, engagement range, modularity, and perhaps battle group cooperation and the
single-purpose platform all suggest an important role for sustaining innovations in the
Navy after Next. On the other hand, the emphasis on affordability, reduced manning,
and most conceptions of single-purpose ships will pull demand toward disruptive in-
novations that may encourage some degree of restructuring of the shipbuilding sector.
Customer-Supplier Relationships
To the extent that transformation requires some disruptive innovation, the close
customer-supplier relationship between the Navy and the Big Six shipyards may delay,
if not undermine, the process. On the other hand, that established relationship may
help promote sustaining aspects of transformation and may allow the Big Six to serve
as platform integrators, brokering connections among new entrants unfamiliar with
military operations and requirements, suppliers of military mission systems, and the
military customer.
Until relatively recently, shipbuilders of necessity worked closely with the Navy, if for
no other reason than that the Navy reserved design and engineering functions to such
organizations as NAVSEA. Further, the Navy maintained its own yards to provide the
bulk of the maintenance and upgrades required by the fleet. In day-to-day terms, naval
officers supervised the production of ships and submarines and then worked hand in
glove with private yards throughout their shakedown cruises. The Navy has been able
to cede most ship-design responsibility to private firms only because it is confident
that those firms well understand its core interests.
4 2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
On the other hand, NCW advocates point out that many technological advances are
brewing in shipyards outside the Big Six. As a result, the advocates hope, the Navy can
break its ties with established suppliers so that it can gain access to the new technolo-
gies. Existing commercial shipyards, especially in other countries, are now pushing the
boundaries with new hull designs, production processes, and propulsion systems that
might support the requirements of the Navy after Next. The Visby, La Fayette, Jervis
Bay, WestPac Express, Triton, Skjold, and other innovative designs come from Swedish,
French, Australian, British, Norwegian, and other overseas shipyards. Those shipyards,
despite their various licensing and experimentation agreements with the U.S. Navy
(and the other services), do not have ties as close as those enjoyed by Electric Boat,
Newport News, and the other Big Six yards.
Yet even for the more disruptive platform innovations, established defense firms are
unlikely to be abandoned entirely in the pursuit of military transformation. Generally,
resistance by mainstream customers prevents established commercial firms from pur-
suing disruptive innovations; in the case of network-centric warfare, the innovation
process began with a set of ideas in the customer community. The Navy can tailor its
requirements to promote rather than hinder transformation. Private customers are
constrained by financial pressures that make disruptive innovations look like poor in-
vestments. The Navy chooses its preferred investment priorities as new doctrine devel-
ops, building on its core competency in determining how best to fight; accordingly, the
Navy can set requirements that encourage suppliers to work on disruptive technologies.
Each established defense firm, in addition to its technical skills, has developed a core
competency in working with its military customers. Firms outside the defense sector,
while able to offer sophisticated technical solutions that serve nontraditional perfor-
mance metrics, are unfamiliar with the language in which the military describes its re-
quirements and do not necessarily understand the operational environment in which
military products will be used.
Commercial and foreign shipyards thus may lack the real advantages that a close cus-
tomer relationship would bring to the transformation process. Working with the mili-
tary customer for many years has given the Big Six shipyards a good understanding of
naval operations. The Big Six also follow the Navy’s requirements-generation process,106
so as to respond with alacrity and focus to new requests for design proposals. Yards
outside the traditional industrial base have other customers, whose demands will limit
their ability to commit all of their investment resources to the desires of the Navy. The
question for the future industrial landscape in the shipbuilding sector is whether trans-
formation proponents can engineer suitable teaming arrangements to capitalize on the
platform-integration skills and customer-relationship advantages of the Big Six
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shipyards and also on the sources of innovation (especially disruptive innovation) out-
side the established industrial base.
The Big Six also understand the impact of the customer’s preferences on subcontractor
relationships, and they maintain large databases of suitable subcontractors. In some
ways, those subcontractor relationships may be a drag on the implementation of dis-
ruptive innovations at the subsystem level, but many of the new plumbing or wiring
innovations that one could imagine for ships are actually sustaining innovations. They
ease space or cooling constraints or lower manufacturing costs. New-entrant ship-
builders, on the other hand, might find it difficult to manage subcontractor relation-
ships in the way that the Navy requires (with minimum efficiency losses in the face of
complex acquisition regulations). They also might find it difficult to scan the over-
whelming flood of technological innovations that might find places on a major new
ship design for the Navy—a much more complex process than the relatively simple
platform-integration tasks that are required for commercial or foreign naval vessels.
Finally, outsiders also lack the standard operating procedures that have been developed
by defense firms to manage the unique oversight requirements of selling to a govern-
ment customer. For the military buyer, efficiency (minimizing transaction costs) is an
important goal in the contracting process, but the government also has other crucial
goals that no acquisition-reform proposal can wish away—military effectiveness, ac-
countability for the public trust, and social policies, for instance. Efficiency is not as
important as it would be for a customer in private industry, and defense firms have
adapted accordingly. The transformation process needs to work in harmony with the
American political process, or it will risk being derailed. The established Navy ship-
building sector has demonstrated its ability to work within that process.
Sector Evaluation
If the Navy does choose to acquire network-centric ships, it is possible that shipyards
other than the Big Six might be enticed to enter or reenter the business of building
Navy ships, thereby transforming the landscape of the shipbuilding sector. A small
combatant such as STREETFIGHTER, or more likely the LCS, could be built at yards
other than those of the Big Six. It is no secret that the American shipbuilding industry
lags behind major international competitors in a number of areas, including
small-ship design and manufacturing technology. Of course, the systems-integration
aspect of shipbuilding that the East Coast yards in particular have chosen to empha-
size in recent years would remain an advantage of the traditional producers. But
smaller yards, such as Bender and Bollinger, can overcome that advantage by teaming
with systems integrators. Indeed, Halter Marine107 has done just that in its work for
foreign navies.108
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Depending on the ultimate design, Bollinger Shipyards may be a viable contender for
building the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship. Bollinger has built Coast Guard vessels for
several decades. With the express purposes of learning new production techniques and,
particularly, improving its ability to build aluminum hulls, Bollinger recently entered
into a partnership with Incat of Australia to build high-speed aluminum catamarans in
Louisiana. Bollinger also supports the Joint Venture HSV-X1 experimentation program
in which the U.S. Navy is gaining operational experience with a new ship design for
noncombat transport missions.109 When asked whether they would be interested in bid-
ding on and building a small combatant for the U.S. Navy, Bollinger executives were
unambiguous: yes, they would bid, and yes, they would build the vessels if they won the
contract. When it was suggested that they might be bought out by a larger defense
contractor, they were adamant about their intention and ability to remain an inde-
pendent, family-owned business with the knowledge and facilities necessary to develop
smaller, faster, lighter ships for the Navy after Next.110
In theory at least, with some accommodating changes in U.S. law, the Navy could also
farm out production of all or part of its naval ships—particularly, perhaps, small com-
batants and high-speed theater lift vessels (or at least their hulls)—to the most techno-
logically advanced shipyards in Europe and Asia. At present, however, political and
security concerns virtually preclude this possibility—even, it appears, on a small scale;
political sensitivities about “exporting” jobs and proliferation of weapons technology
are too strong. Many Pentagon officials and congressional leaders already express con-
cern about safeguarding secrets even in domestic facilities. Yet joint ventures, teaming,
and licensing arrangements that would allow the U.S. government and American ship-
builders to develop cooperative relationships with foreign yards are feasible. Bender
and Bollinger have reached agreements with Australia’s Austal and Incat, respectively,
and transformation may help them both break into the defense industrial base and also
contribute to the globalization of the defense market. On the other hand, it is possible
that the globalization inherent in these international joint ventures may actually con-
strain their ability to enter the U.S. military shipbuilding market.111
The Big Six could also face a challenge from systems-integration houses as the Navy
moves to a network-centric future, but this challenge is considerably less likely to revo-
lutionize the defense industrial landscape than is the prospect for entry by commercial
or foreign shipyards. Many people see an intuitive connection between network-centric
warfare’s shift in emphasis from platforms to networks, and a shift in emphasis from
hulls to internal electronics in shipbuilding.112 Consequently, traditional prime contrac-
tors in the aerospace and electronics sectors of the defense industry hope to take the
lead role in integrating naval platforms in the future. Raytheon and Lockheed have al-
ready filled this role in bids on the LPD 17, CVN 77, and DD(X) programs, and the
M I L I T A R Y T R A N S F O R M A T I O N 4 5
teams of bidders for the U.S. Coast Guard’s current DEEPWATER project may well be
harbingers of a transformation of defense industrial relationships and the defense in-
dustrial pecking order.113 On the other hand, disputes are already beginning concerning
whether problems being experienced on such contracts as the LPD 17 are natural
“teething troubles” for such new relationships or are more fundamental, indicating that
in the complex shipbuilding world aerospace contractors may have involved themselves
in a business that they do not truly understand.
It does seem clear that trying to force this particular change on the shipbuilding indus-
try is undesirable, because it throws away the benefit of a core competency of the estab-
lished prime shipbuilders. They actually specialize in the complex integration of
electronics into naval platforms—dealing with space, power supply, cooling, antenna
placement, and other issues that must be balanced with structural demands of ship de-
sign. Moreover, the leading naval shipyards have established procedures for subcon-
tracting for naval electronics systems—sometimes even working with units of the same
aerospace primes that are trying to move into the ship systems integration role. Their
ability to solicit bids from suppliers of subsystems and manage subcontracts that meet
defense acquisition requirements is a key comparative advantage relative to the poten-
tial for commercial and foreign shipyards to serve as prime contractors.
Unmanned Vehicles
Unmanned vehicles (UVs) are ubiquitous in joint and service visions of the military af-
ter next. A striking number of unmanned aerial, surface, and subsurface assets popu-
late depictions of the future battlespace.114 Unmanned vehicles are to bring a number of
critical capabilities to the fight. They will be employed as ISR assets, communications
relays, and precision strike platforms. Many, though not all,115 of the tasks envisioned
for UVs in the future are currently performed by manned platforms or space-based as-
sets. In this report we focus specifically on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) because
(1) they represent the most highly developed segment of the general UV market, and
(2) they are expected to perform the widest range of future missions. Existing UAVs
such as General Atomics’ Predator and Northrop Grumman’s Global Hawk have played
important roles in recent conflicts ranging from the Balkans to Afghanistan. If NCW
becomes the organizing concept underlying military transformation, the Navy and the
other services will acquire a large number of unmanned platforms that will be assigned
an increasingly greater number of roles, missions, and functions.116
Our second sector comprises firms now designing and building, or capable of design-
ing and building, unmanned aerial vehicles. This industrial sector has emerged only re-
cently, unlike shipbuilding, which has existed as a distinct industrial sector for
hundreds of years.117 However, the type of firm that will supply UAVs to the military
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after next remains an open question. Existing firms like Northrop Grumman’s Ryan
Aeronautical118 and General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc., enjoy the advantage of
having built deployed UAVs. Yet they may not remain the suppliers of choice in the fu-
ture, since the critical performance metrics for unmanned systems are not entrenched.
In theory, at least, competing firms could offer better solutions to outstanding techni-
cal challenges, thereby setting the standard for future acquisition. In this section we
survey the UAV industrial landscape, identify possible performance metrics for current
and future unmanned systems, examine the nature of customer-supplier relationships
in the sector, and explore the future of the UAV sector in the transformation process.
The UAV Sector Today and Tomorrow
Although UAVs have been used by the U.S. military at least since the Lightning Bug was
deployed in Vietnam, many subsequent efforts were canceled, including the Aquila,
Amber, Medium Range, and Hunter.119 Even such relatively successful UAVs as the Pio-
neer were deployed in only limited numbers and suffered from performance limita-
tions. Why the United States has not used unmanned aerial vehicles more extensively,
thus nourishing an industrial sector to develop and produce them, is unclear. As a
RAND report noted, “It has been technically possible to build generic UAV platforms
for several decades, and many have been built and used as aerial targets and reconnais-
sance drones.”120 Analysts stress institutional and cultural resistance to UAVs as well as
an absence of clear demand due to competition from a diverse array of successful plat-
forms for performing similar missions.
Yet by defense industry standards, the industrial landscape of potential UAV manufac-
turers is thickly populated. More than thirty firms were active in the UAV sector in
2001 (see table 4). During the past decade, most DoD and service R&D and procure-
ment spending on UAVs has gone to Northrop Grumman’s Ryan Aeronautical, Boeing,
and General Atomics. Several smaller firms, such as AAI Corporation and Aero-
Vironment, Inc., have built relatively successful UAV prototypes and experimental plat-
forms for DARPA, NASA, the U.S. Army, and other government agencies. Three other
types of firms may also have the expertise to enter into the UAV market in the future:
(1) traditional defense firms, such as TRW, that have built UAVs in the not-so-distant
past;121 (2) start-up firms that may offer innovative solutions to long-standing techno-
logical challenges facing UAVs; and (3) foreign UAV manufacturers.
There is a thriving international UAV market. In contrast to other areas of defense ac-
quisition, European militaries, individually and as part of NATO or the European
Union’s “Rapid Reaction Force,” have invested considerable resources in UAVs. A num-
ber of competitors to American-built UAVs are already on the market, partially in re-
sponse to this European demand. Nineteen companies in France, Germany, and the
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United Kingdom alone were actively engaged in the UAV market in 2001. Israel also has
a long history of building UAV systems. Its operational successes with UAVs dates back
to operations over Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. Seven Israeli firms are presently active in the
UAV business.122
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COMPANIES UAVS COMPANIES UAVS
AAI Corp. Shadow Insitu Group Seascan
AeroVironment Black Widow,
Centurion, Pointer,
Hiline, Pathfinder
Kaman Aerospace
Corp.
K-Max
Advanced Hybrid
Aircraft
Hornet, Wasp Lockheed Martin 420K, LOCASS
Advanced Soaring
Concepts
Apex Meggitt Defense
Systems
Sentry
Aurora Flight
Sciences
Chiron, Perseus,
Theseus, UCAV
Demonstrator
Micro Craft
Technology
LADF
BAE Systems R4E SkyEye Mission
Technologies, Inc.
Backpack,
Mini-Vanguard,
Vixen, Hellfox
BAI Aerosystems Aeros, Exdrone,
Javelin, Tern
Northrop Grumman
Ryan Aeronautical
ADM-160 MALD,
BQM-74C,
BQM-145A, Global
Hawk, Fire Scout,
Scarab, Sea Ferret,
Star-Bird, X-47
Pegasus
Bell Helicopter
Textron
Eagle Eye Orion Aviation Seabat
Boeing Dragon Fly, X-36,
X-45A
Raytheon Electronic
Systems
AN/ALE-50
Bosch Aerospace AURA, SASS-LITE SAIC Vigilante
California
Unmanned Vehicles,
Inc.
CUV SLURS Sanders Defense
Systems
MicroSTAR
Daedalus Research,
Inc.
Dakota Scaled Composites,
Inc.
Proteus
Dragonfly Pictures,
Inc.
DP4 Sikorsky Aircraft Cypher, Dragon
Warrior
Freewing Aerial
Robotics, Corp.
Freewing Tilt-Body Skysat Systems Corp. High Altitude Airship
Frontier Systems, Inc. Hummingbird TCOM LP 15M, 32M, 71M
General Atomics Altus, Gnat,
Predator, Prowler
Thorpe Seeop, Corp. RM1 Spinwing
GSE, Inc. Vindicator USBI, Co. Dragon
TABLE 4
U.S. Private Sector UAV Manufacturers
Source: Kenneth Munson, ed., Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, Issue Seventeen (Coulsdon, Surrey, UK, and Alexandria,
VA: Jane’s Information Group Limited, December 2001), pp. 194–312.
NCW and UAVs
Network-centric warfare envisions employing UAVs in many roles: as long-endurance
communication relays (supporting the network); as small, inexpensive, fast-moving,
hard-to-detect sensors (nodes to support a common operational picture); and as plat-
forms for delivering precision strikes against targets that are too difficult or dangerous
for manned platforms to reach. Moreover, other service and joint vision documents
and transformation roadmaps suggest that UAVs will play other important roles in the
future as well. If anything, NCW and Navy planning documents place less emphasis on
UAVs than do those of the other services—not because the Navy is less enthusiastic but
because it foresees a rosy future not only for UAVs but also for UUVs and USVs.
Through these diverse uses, military transformation will for the first time establish core
performance metrics for the UAV industry.
Emerging UAV Performance Metrics
Which types of domestic and international firms will prosper as UAV usage in the mili-
tary matures will depend largely on the evolution of those metrics. Firms with the
technical capacity and experience necessary to meet emerging measures of success will,
in all likelihood, win future design and production competitions—providing, of
course, that the services budget sufficient resources.
Two general schools of thought on UAV performance metrics can be discerned. Ac-
cording to the first, UAVs have been built for years; they resemble other, already suc-
cessful products (whether autopilots on commercial aircraft or various forms of cruise
missiles and unmanned target drones). Thus, once the military commits to fielding
UAVs and determines what roles they will play in future conflicts, they can be built in
greater numbers. Performance metrics are not a significant issue; they are the same as
for “similar” systems—the implication being that the technological challenges can be
solved with sustaining innovation.
The second school believes that UAVs are unique, that their performance metrics will
not easily transfer from other types of systems and platforms. When we asked govern-
ment personnel involved in UAV acquisition programs, industry officials, and outside
observers about whether there are generally accepted and well understood performance
metrics for these systems, we received a variety of answers. This lack of consensus re-
flects real uncertainty. We have identified a set of ten possible performance metrics.
Mean Time between Failures. This metric refers not to survivability against enemy
countermeasures (although this ultimately matters too) but to ability to remain in
the air without experiencing either catastrophic failures or operator errors from
which recovery is not possible. This metric can be applied to all military systems (and
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commercial systems as well). It does not distinguish UAVs from alternative platforms
and systems.
Mean time between failures may, however, help us distinguish successful UAVs and
their manufacturers from their less successful competitors. General Atomics executives
claim that the Predator is the only UAV that has demonstrated exceptional success on
this measure. They further claim that the performance of the soon-to-be operational
Predator B will be even better.123 Whether their claims are accurate is subject to inter-
pretation; from recent reports we know that in the Afghan campaign at least twenty-
five Predators have “crashed [due] to mechanical failure, weather, or operator [error]”
or to enemy fire.124 Other UAVs, both deployed and in the OT&E stages, have also been
plagued by numerous failures. Global Hawks have crashed several times during that
program’s short life; reported causes range from quality control problems to operator
errors. Certainly, if UAV manufacturers cannot meet this basic performance character-
istic, they will not be viable producers for the military after next.
Affordability. Affordability is purported to be a key advantage of unmanned systems
of all kinds. If NCW requires populating the future battlespace with numerous UAVs
performing a diverse array of missions, cost will be an issue. The Global Hawk, for ex-
ample, began with an ACTD budget goal of ten million dollars per copy, yet a recent
estimate put the out-year cost at roughly seventy-five million per system.125
Like mean time between failure, this metric appears to apply to all military systems.
However, affordability may play a special role in determining the attractiveness of an
emerging technology for greater or more varied roles in future military operations. For
UAV manufacturers and transformation advocates attempting to attract new users with
new types of missions, price is a selling point. If UAVs perform well enough and stay
within budget constraints, they may be more attractive for some end users than sys-
tems that perform spectacularly but remain prohibitively expensive. On the other
hand, some supporters of UAV acquisition fear that exaggerated expectations of
affordability are one of the reasons that they have not yet been widely adopted by mili-
tary forces.126 The UAV development process is vulnerable to the same “gold plating”
pressures that plague other programs. An increase in costs is likely to reduce the num-
ber of systems that end users will be willing or able to acquire.127 As a result, UAV advo-
cates may choose to promote their products by minimizing the weight placed on
affordability as a performance metric.
Reduced Manpower Requirements. UAVs do not reduce personnel requirements as di-
rectly as the caricatures provided in news reports often suggest; while UAVs have no
flight crews, they still require remote operators (equivalent to pilots) and maintenance
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and support crews. They have substantial logistical tails; nevertheless, their “tails” are
smaller than those of forward-deployed manned aircraft.
Fielding and sustaining a fleet of manned aircraft is incredibly labor intensive; every-
thing from training to maintenance is required, involving thousands of hours of man-
power. UAVs may at least reduce the time and money needed for training. UAV
operators (with their associated support personnel) can accomplish much of their
training and skill development on simulators, in contrast to the hundreds of hours in
the air that manned-aircraft pilots must spend developing and maintaining their profi-
ciency. In addition, UAV system developers can readily incorporate simulator functions
into flight control stations.
Flight Endurance. The duration of manned aircraft flights is constrained by physical
limitations of the flight crew, among other factors. Short of rotating aircrews already
onboard, manned aircraft cannot simply linger for long periods without losing their ef-
fectiveness (regardless of the ability of the aircraft itself to remain aloft and the amount
of “down time” an aircrew might enjoy during a mission). UAVs offer more flexibility.
First, multiple teams of operators at various remote ground control stations (GCSs)
can operate the same UAVs in succession. Duration of flights is then only limited by
the power supply available to the craft, the possibility of mechanical failure, and, in
combat situations, the UAV’s survival. Second, recent operational deployments suggest
that software improvements could reduce the demand for operator intervention and
the need to transmit certain types of data during UAV flights.
Power Supply. The quality of power sources is another possible UAV performance
metric. Power affects both the ability of the aircraft to fly and the types of mission
packages that can be carried on the basic UAV airframe. Flight duration, cruising
speed, communications capabilities, and sensor strength, for instance, all depend on
the amount of power generated by the UAV’s engine, the fuel efficiency of that en-
gine, the quality and longevity of the power source, and the stability and continuity
of the power flow. Many ISR packages require a great deal of energy to operate; the
development of new power supplies may expand the range and quality of the ISR
packages that can be bundled into UAVs.
Mission Payload. A UAV is only as effective as the mission payload it carries, whether
the payload is a sensor suite, a communications system, or a weapon. For UAV manu-
facturers, the task is to design or purchase the best payloads (from the perspective of
the end user) and integrate them onto the platform. Although engineers can make
trade-offs among the various desired performance characteristics of UAVs, designs
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should maximize the ability to carry mission systems; UAV makers must learn to
choose compact, energy-efficient subsystems.
Datalink Quality. The ability of the UAV to communicate with the GCS and with
other platforms and sensors in and around the battlespace is critical. If, for example,
the UAV carries an ISR payload, it needs to be able to transmit data at times and in for-
mats useful to consumers. Relevant trade-offs include where to process the sensor data
(on board the UAV, at the consumer’s location, or at some intermediary point) and
how often to download information (continuously, at scheduled intervals, or at critical
points determined by the characteristics of the acquired data). In all cases, the accuracy
and reliability of download and upload technologies and protocols must be sufficient
to meet the needs of users. Datalink quality also determines the ability of the remote
human operator to control the craft, especially under adverse conditions of, say,
weather, terrain, or enemy action.
Plays Well with Others. Another key constraint on existing UAVs is the requirement
that they fly safely in the same airspace as manned systems and other UAVs.128 This re-
quirement would appear relevant for all platforms, not just unmanned systems. At
present, situational awareness is more limited for UAVs than it is for traditional
manned aircraft,129 but as testing and operational experience with UAVs accumulates,
their capabilities should catch up—especially since manned aircraft face constraints
too (due to, for example, canopy design). Not all manned aircraft can easily accommo-
date extra personnel dedicated to monitoring sensors; UAV ground stations can more
readily be expanded to relieve the burden on the pilot, and their computer processing
power can readily be augmented to enhance data management capabilities.
Mission Controlled by End User. One of the driving forces underlying demand for
UAVs in recent conflicts has been the perception (and the reality) that other types of
assets performing similar functions are not under the direct command and control of
the end user. Deployed Army and Marine units sometimes find it difficult to task ISR
and strike assets controlled by the Air Force and the Navy. UAVs directly attached to lo-
cal commanders will, by definition, be more responsive. Insofar as UAVs can be de-
signed to facilitate interactions with the ultimate consumers of their services, this
metric will play a critical role in determining whether UAV projects will find sponsors.
Optimizing operational control of UAVs requires that numerous technical and orga-
nizational issues be resolved. For potential UAV suppliers, key technical issues include
where to locate processing and analytical capability and how to deliver data to the
end user.
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Safety of Personnel. Of all the potential performance metrics that may determine out-
comes for the UAV sector, the elimination of risk to pilots appears to matter most. With
the important exception of space-based assets performing ISR and communications-
relay missions, UAVs compete with systems that, by definition, put their operators at
risk. Navy and Air Force aircraft that perform close air support or deep strikes may be
shot down, risking the death or capture of the flight crews. By contrast, if a Predator
equipped with Hellfire missiles is shot down, only equipment is lost. The emphasis on
saving lives is especially important when mission performance depends on close prox-
imity to the battlespace—a factor that stimulates demand for tactical UAVs.
Which performance metric, or group of performance metrics, will set the standards for
UAV designers and builders will be revealed over the next several years as the results of
testing, experimentation, and operational experience become available. Although most
potential UAV metrics appear to require sustaining innovations by existing firms, it is
possible that new firms will prove more adept at providing the Navy with products
maximizing particular disruptive performance metrics. For instance, a new firm could
develop UAVs capable of reliable autonomous operations. Greater autonomy could
prove disruptive, because most UAV manufacturers have not, to date, made this their
primary focus or invested heavily in the technologies that would allow for it. Yet suc-
cessfully resolving the autonomy challenge might be attractive to consumers; it would,
for example, help reduce the manpower required to operate UAVs.
Until questions about specific disruptive and sustaining performance metrics are re-
solved, firms with proven track records will remain in the driver’s seat, while late en-
trants and start-ups will seek to break into the marketplace based on new technologies
and skill sets adapted from the design and production of other weapons systems. The
performance metrics that ultimately set the standard will determine the extent to
which UAV suppliers will be expected to provide sustaining or disruptive innovations.
In this still evolving sector, it is not yet clear whether customer requirements will be
met predominantly by sustaining or disruptive innovation. Both are likely to be
required.
Customer-Supplier Relationships
Performance metrics alone will not determine which types of firms will thrive when
and if the U.S. Navy and the other services make wholesale purchases of UAVs. Existing
and emerging customer relationships will also shape the future industrial landscape.
Because the services have not yet purchased many UAVs, neither acquisition organiza-
tions nor their technical advisors have formed close relationships with particular con-
tractors in this sector. Instead, several firms have modest track records, and a larger
group of companies can claim either direct experience with, or demonstrable technical
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potential for responding to requests for, proposals. Translating these limited ties into a
comfortable working relationship with military customers will help determine which
types of potential UAV suppliers are most able to match their technical skills to the op-
erational requirements of network-centric warfare.
The relationship-building experience of the contractors that are currently selling UAVs
to the U.S. military shows the nascent state of the sector. General Atomics explicitly
hopes to profit from its track record; the Predator and its follow-on, the Predator B, are
already flying and purportedly can be adapted in short order to fulfill most UAV mis-
sion requirements if the military communicates them clearly to General Atomics.
However, General Atomics executives complain sharply that the U.S. Navy does not
recognize the demonstrated superiority of their products and has declined to develop
doctrine and establish requirements by actually flying Predators. Instead, by the execu-
tives’ account, the Navy insists on more paper studies and more experimental proto-
type development before buying any UVs, specifically including Predator.130 As much as
General Atomics would like to have a close, trusted relationship with the U.S. Navy, it is
clear that it does not have an inside track.
Having acquired the established UAV manufacturer Ryan Aeronautical and subse-
quently developed the Global Hawk, Northrop Grumman appears to have bought itself
credibility within the UAV community. However, Global Hawk has not yet demon-
strated peak performance for extended periods, and chronic equipment failures suggest
that Northrop Grumman will have to work hard to maintain the position that it has
attained.131 While Congress has mandated that the Navy purchase several Global
Hawks as a means of experimenting with unmanned systems as a supplement to
manned patrol aircraft, the Navy has not shown a propensity to cooperate closely with
Ryan Aeronautical. Though the program was subsequently revived, the Navy terminated
the Fire Scout, Ryan Aeronautical’s prototype vertical-takeoff UAV, at the flight test
stage, because the acquisition community lacked an experimentation plan under
which to use the craft to develop future mission requirements.132 All the equity that
Northrop Grumman really has in this respect is its overall corporate commitment to
position itself as “the RMA firm.” It invests more effort than most other defense firms
in understanding the nature of network-centric operations. If the parent company’s
pro-transformation stance filters down to the UAV division, it may have an advantage
in responding to future requirements for the Navy after Next.
Boeing too has gone to great lengths to demonstrate network-centric expertise. It has
produced extensive independent analyses of NCW and used them to supplement
NWDC strategic planning documents. Boeing’s future as a producer of UAVs hinges on
the success of its prototype UCAV, the X-45.133 If the X-45 turns out to be a technical
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success, it will help Boeing to establish the capability to meet key UAV performance
metrics. But even if the X-45 itself does not perform well, the program could provide
Boeing with inside information and a comfortable relationship with evolving military
requirements for UCAVs.134
The problems that existing UAV producers face in their relations with the Navy, how-
ever, pale in comparison with the difficulties facing start-up firms and other small
companies. Officials from mainstream UAV manufacturers and the Navy’s UAV R&D
and acquisition organizations joke about the stereotypical wild-eyed tinkers working in
their garages to produce “big model airplanes,” which they hope are the same thing as
militarily useful UAVs. It would be tempting to dismiss their scorn as uninformed, but
some small UAV ventures seem to invite such criticisms. Many UAV start-ups do work
out of “garages,” employ engineers with little understanding of military requirements,
and use business models often hinging on joint ventures with, or acquisition by, other
manufacturers, particularly firms with established relationships with the military cus-
tomer. In short, it would appear that there are long odds against serious challenges by
new entrants for leadership of the UAV industry.
Sector Evaluation
In all likelihood, growth in the UAV market will not require disruptive innovation, in
the sense in which the term is typically used. Defense firms have a long history of pro-
ducing unmanned systems—from Vietnam-era versions of contemporary UAVs to
cruise missiles.135 Boeing, General Atomics, and Northrop Grumman have already de-
veloped significant UAVs, and they collectively, at least initially, have a lead in
weaponization of unmanned vehicles. Some quality metrics for such systems are well
known, although many high-performance UAV technologies are still immature. But be-
cause almost none of the past programs has entered full-rate production, current de-
fense aerospace manufacturers do not have much investment in UAV-related customer
relationships. Technically skilled new entrants, however, have even less familiarity with
military culture or warfighters’ professional expertise. The net result is that the future
defense industrial landscape in the UAV sector is wide open.
At least until very recently, the industry’s comfort level in producing UAVs appeared to
exceed that of the military in using them. Resistance to UAVs remains, and will remain,
among defense industry stalwarts and within some Navy and other service communi-
ties, especially when UAVs threaten missions normally assigned to manned assets.
Much of this resistance plays out in the planning, programming, and budgetary pro-
cesses. In recent years, interested congressional leaders, such as Senator John Warner
(R-Va.), have ensured the availability of additional resource for UAVs, but the Penta-
gon’s relative disinterest in the fruits of that investment has delayed the development of
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performance standards. The future of this sector is highly dependent on the strength of
the military services’ presumed commitment to UAVs as part of military transforma-
tion; S&T and R&D monies sufficient to overcome technological hurdles and opera-
tional challenges have not been allocated.
As transformation advocates and planners envision new missions for UAVs and other
unmanned vehicles, they will eventually develop a full array of performance standards
for the defense industrial base. Even relatively successful current projects face signifi-
cant “capabilities gaps.” For example, the current generation of UAVs requires in-
tense human operator involvement, which limits their usability. They are also highly
vulnerable to enemy attack and countermeasures, and they exhibit limited fault tol-
erance, making them prone to crash. Other problems are certain to emerge as re-
quirements for UCAVs work their way through the acquisition system for the first
time. Firms will need to (1) develop for all types of UAVs command-and-control
systems that will allow them to operate in a battlespace populated with manned sys-
tems and (2) provide future warfighters reasons for confidence that UCAVs will be
able to distinguish legitimate targets from noncombatants. Partnerships among estab-
lished defense contractors, start-up UAV specialists, and in-house experts in military
operations can be expected to set the pace for the contribution of unmanned vehicles
to military transformation.
Systems Integration
The network-centric transformation vision relies heavily on the ability of various
nodes to share information in real time using a range of interconnected networks.
Achieving the NCW vision will require lashing networks together, maintaining net-
works in the face of constant change, making intelligent trade-offs among competing
system designs, and assigning operational roles to various platforms. Transformation
thus places a high premium on systems-integration skills and upon the public and pri-
vate organizations that possess them.
A basic definition of systems integration emphasizes interoperability—the requirement
that each military system work in concert with other systems, on the basis of sufficient
communication across well-defined interfaces. Network-centric warfare concepts obvi-
ously stress such intersystem compatibility; casual discussions of systems integration in
the context of transformation, in fact, often refer only to interoperability require-
ments.136 However, ensuring interoperability is only one part of the systems integrators’
task. Systems integrators are responsible for a number of roles during the overall acqui-
sition process, beginning with translating objectives derived from military doctrine
into technical requirements suitable for launching acquisition programs. The key part
of this process is making trade-offs of capabilities among various systems—given a set
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of desired capabilities, which component of the system of systems should perform each
of them? In the current, early stages of thinking about network-centric warfare, sys-
tems integration should define the nodes that make up the network, the capabilities
that will be essential for each type of node, and the number of nodes that must partici-
pate in various operations. Later in the acquisition process, systems integrators must
maintain control of technical standards and interfaces (ensuring interoperability),
manage cooperation among contractors and subcontractors, test products and their
subcomponents, and support users’ efforts to customize and modernize products as
missions and technologies evolve.
There are several levels of systems integration in the defense sector; all of them involve
making choices between technical alternatives and establishing links between disparate
equipment so that heterogeneous parts can operate together. First, at the “lowest” level,
weapon-system integration, various components, often supplied by subcontractors, are
tied into a single product (e.g., a surface-to-air missile or a fire-control radar).137 Cer-
tain key facilities owned by the prime defense contractors specialize in this type of sys-
tems integration (such as Raytheon in Tucson, Arizona, for missiles, or Northrop
Grumman in Linthicum, Maryland, for radars). Second, platform integration combines
various types of equipment (weapons, propulsion, sensors, communications, etc.) into
mission-capable assemblages. This second process is not necessarily more or less com-
plex than weapon-system integration, nor does it necessarily add more or less value;
different types of systems integration must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. But
again, some prime contractors (Lockheed Martin Aeronautics in Fort Worth, Texas, or
General Dynamics’ Bath Ironworks in Bath, Maine) define platform integration as one
of their core competencies.
The real emphasis in transformation—and the level of systems integration that is now
most ardently pursued by defense-oriented organizations—is system-of-systems inte-
gration, or architecture-systems integration. It connects different types of platforms so
as to facilitate cooperative military operations; it constitutes the technical counterpart
to the military services’ operational expertise (knowledge of how to fight). It essentially
translates doctrinal statements of objectives into sets of requirements that can be writ-
ten into the acquisition community’s contracts with industry; it involves broad
trade-offs among different technical approaches—for example, hardware-versus-
software solutions, or a decision on whether to transmit raw or processed data across
the network. Historically, system-of-systems integration has been accomplished by or-
ganizations within the military services (e.g., laboratories that support systems com-
mands, like the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division) or closely allied to
them (specialty organizations, including federally funded research and development
centers [FFRDCs] like the MITRE Corporation). Network-centric warfare’s emphasis
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on simplified platforms, distributed capabilities, and interconnection of military assets
via advanced communications networks will force the acquisition community to rely
more than ever on first-class system-of-systems integration.
Military-oriented systems-integration skill is based on advanced, interdisciplinary
technical knowledge—sufficient understanding of all of the systems and subsystems to
make optimizing trade-offs. It also requires a detailed grasp of military goals and oper-
ations as well as a reservoir of trust that bridges military, economic, and political inter-
ests. Some systems-integration (SI) organizations also have some production
capabilities (which may be either an advantage or a liability to the integration process),
but systems integration is a separate task from platform building and from subsystem
development and manufacturing.
Systems integration is an independent sector of the defense industrial base, but one
with porous boundaries that sometimes allow members of other sectors (e.g., platform
builders) access. Different combinations of systems-integration capabilities are found
in traditional defense industry prime contractors, specialized systems integration
houses, FFRDCs and other quasi-public organizations, and the military laboratories.
Because all these organizational types understand the crucial role of systems integra-
tion in transformation, most are maneuvering to establish their credibility as systems
integrators; for example, prime contractors justify acquisitions on the grounds that
they contribute to a “systems integration capability,” and military laboratories rewrite
mission statements to emphasize systems integration.138
Organizations that can provide systems integration services should have a key, early
role in implementing transformation. Objectives for projects in other sectors of the de-
fense industry—such as for platform makers, like shipbuilders—will flow down from
the overall definition of the network-centric system of systems. Early in the transfor-
mation process, systems integrators need to determine what capabilities are necessary
for each type of node in the network, in light of the technical, operational, and eco-
nomic implications of how capabilities are distributed. This job is one for which the
massive, complex Cold War defense effort left the United States well prepared. Organi-
zations that specialize in system-of-systems integration were established in those years
as part of the ballistic missile and air defense programs, and in cooperation, they also
played vital roles in developing equipment for maritime strategy, missile defense, and
other system-of-systems missions. Network-centric warfare calls for sustaining innova-
tion in the systems integration sector; transformation advocates need to recognize and
exploit the established skills at the front end of the process.
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The System-of-Systems Integration Sector Today and Tomorrow
Many organizations have at least some expertise that might contribute to system-of-
systems integration for the Navy (for a list of examples, see table 5).
As the customer for military equipment, the Navy must define projects’ objectives, but
the actual technical system-of-systems integration task is very difficult for the Navy it-
self to accomplish. The acquisition community’s core competencies, resident in the sys-
tem commands, are in understanding government regulations and monitoring
suppliers’ compliance with cost, schedule, and other contractual terms; acquisition
agents are usually not expert in state-of-the-art technologies and the innovative capa-
bilities of various firms. The Navy’s old technical bureaus were phased out during the
second half of the Cold War, and technical tasks were increasingly outsourced to pri-
vate industry.139 Systems commands can still draw on expertise from subsidiary labora-
tories (e.g., SPAWAR Systems Center, San Diego, for C4ISR), which maintain
important niche capabilities, research expertise, and key physical assets (e.g., model
basins) required to develop and test new designs “end to end.” Unfortunately, the rela-
tionship between science-oriented military laboratories and regulation-oriented sys-
tems commands is often tense. Scientists often feel that the continuity of their research
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GOVERNMENT PRIVATE, NONPROFIT PRIVATE, FOR-PROFIT
Analysis
System Commands
(SPAWAR, NAVSEA,
NAVAIR)
Center for Naval
Analysis, Institute for
Defense Analysis,
RAND
ANSER, TASC, Booz
Allen Hamilton
Scientific Research
Naval Research
Laboratory, SPAWAR
Systems Center, San
Diego*
APL, Lincoln
Laboratory, Software
Engineering Institute
Technical Support
SPAWAR Systems
Center, San Diego*
APL, MITRE,
Aerospace
Corporation
SAIC, SYNTEK
Production
Lockheed Martin—
Naval Electronics and
Surveillance Systems,
Raytheon Command
Control
Communications
and Information
Systems
Testing and Fleet
Support
SPAWAR Systems
Center, San Diego*
TABLE 5
Examples of NCW-Related System-of-Systems Integration Organizations
* Each of the Navy’s acquisition system commands has related technical organizations equivalent to the SPAWAR Systems Center—
for example, the Naval Air Warfare Center, China Lake, and the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren.
Note: Some organizations have additional small-scale activities that give them limited capability in other boxes in the above matrix—
for example, SPAWAR Systems Center, San Diego, manufactures Link 16 antennas for surface combatants. The above designations
are intended to capture organizations’ core competencies rather than ancillary work.
and their technical skills are undermined by frequent “cherry-picking” of researchers
out of the laboratory and into the system command itself. For their part, systems com-
mand personnel tend to believe that scientists should support their immediate needs
for technical advice and technologies rather than pursue research projects that may or
may not pay off.
This difficult interface between “pure” science and system acquisition is a challenge for
all forms of technical advisory organization—not just for the military’s in-house labo-
ratories—but the difficulty is magnified within the military chain of command. Inter-
nal Navy technical capabilities are, on the one hand, constrained by civil service rules,
which prevent the Navy from competing effectively for the services of many top scien-
tists and engineers. On the other hand, the same rules protect internal technical staff
from competitive and budgetary threats. The operational Navy often perceives the
Navy laboratories and technical advisors as less cooperative than the highly responsive
scientists and engineers in private defense industry, who can be induced to work hard
for the military through appropriate contractual compensation. As a result, the opera-
tional Navy often fails to support the Navy laboratories aggressively.140 This tension
may be exacerbated by “industrial funding,” which forces laboratories to seek “busi-
ness” from within other parts of the Navy, other government agencies, and even private
industry, by drumming up external contracts and participating in various project
“teams,” usually with specific, short-term deliverable products.
Warfighters do support the laboratory system, but only in a particular way that under-
mines the labs’ ability to conduct analyses of alternatives and make high-level trade-
offs among technical approaches. The Navy’s system centers are very good at fleet
support. But those close ties to quick-reaction demands of the fleet do not comport
with the standardization and interface stewardship role of the systems integrator, and
the skills that enable fast fixes in the field—especially of particular systems or subsys-
tems—are not the same as the skills that produce thoughtful optimization of the sys-
tem of systems.
Laboratories emphasize testing system performance, confirming that prototypes meet
specifications, and determining which of several submissions best meets military ac-
quisition criteria. This emphasis permeates these organizations so strongly that several
scientists in military laboratories that we interviewed even defined systems integration
precisely in terms of testing performance and interoperability. While they understand
the importance of technical advice during the analysis of alternatives before the defini-
tion of performance-evaluation criteria, laboratory personnel particularly value feed-
back from testing physical systems in improving the ability to define later projects. On
the other hand, organizations other than in-house labs do extensive testing and
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prototype evaluation as part of system development, even though they do not perform
the final stage of customer acceptance tests. If in-house scientists are right that testing
can help maintain technical skills and reveal important lines of evolutionary research,
it might be desirable to sell the major testing facilities—the remnants of the unique in-
tellectual and physical capital inside the military—to the organizations that can act as
full system-of-systems integrators. The goal would be to leave the systems commands
with enough technical competence to act as “smart buyers” that can react to technical
advice and choose among systems integration proposals developed by outside organi-
zations having the full range of facilities and skills at the system-of-systems level.
With the services’ increasing emphasis in their visions of the future on high-level
systems integration, traditional prime contractors that specialize in platform de-
sign and production have begun to offer architecture systems-integration services.
Firms with core competencies in electronics and network-oriented activities are
also angling for platform systems-integration work, arguing that interplatform in-
tegration (interoperability) is becoming ever more important in the design of the
platforms themselves.
Prime contractors have focused for years on understanding the unique demands of the
military customer, hiring retired military officers for important positions in their stra-
tegic planning departments. Private firms are also largely exempt from civil service
rules, allowing them the flexibility to hire top technical talent when necessary;141 for
scientists who crave equity compensation, private firms can also offer stock options.142
When technical teams develop internal rapport that generates extra value from syner-
gies or experience, private firms have incentives to support such built-up human capi-
tal. Managing technical personnel is a core competency of technology-dependent
private firms, including defense industry prime contractors.143
However, platform systems integration and system-of-systems integration are not the
same task, and it is not even clear that developing skill at one helps very much in devel-
oping skill at the other. Platform integrators may improve their performance through
any of a number of different activities: repeated design or prototype development ex-
perience; production experience; and maintenance of close relationships with applied
technical laboratories, basic science research establishments, academic institutions, or
the operational user community.144 Their unique advantage is in linking systems-
engineering capability with intricate knowledge of the manufacturing process, allowing
them to take advantage of production efficiency advantages in the design process. Nat-
urally, prime contractors emphasize the importance of production capability in their
discussions of systems integration—just as military laboratories emphasize the impor-
tance of full-scale system testing. However, while this advantage surely carries weight, it
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is likely to be relatively small in the defense sector, where production runs are often
short and very-close-tolerance production processes are often craftlike, minimizing the
potential for major savings. Such production issues should consequently receive a rela-
tively low weighting in the system-of-systems integration trade space, although system-
of-systems specialists should strive to consider platform makers’ concerns when they
do their overall analyses and define their requirements. System-of-systems concerns
about platforms’ interfaces with the network should take precedence in transformation
planning and acquisition.
Moreover, the potential for conflicts of interest—or at least for the appearance of con-
flicts of interest, a more stringent standard that has been deemed appropriate for gov-
ernment organizations—mandates a separation between architecture-systems
integration and production in the defense industry. Production prime contractors have
the technical capability to scan subcontractors’ products, including the offerings of in-
novative commercial firms, for likely partners in the network-centric defense indus-
try—that is, they can fulfill one of the key technical and management requirements of
a systems integrator. They also can make technical decisions about interfaces, network
standards, and other requirements definitions; by vertically integrating so as to com-
bine platform and components-oriented design and production organizations, large
prime contractors might provide technical systems-integration services with minimal
transaction costs. But the idea of expanding the roles of established prime contractors
faces a crucial nontechnical barrier—lack of trust. Manufacturers certainly test their
products before delivery to the customer, but the customer also needs an independent
ability to verify product performance—just as military laboratories emphasize. In addi-
tion, the customer might reasonably fear that a manufacturer’s trade-off analysis might
be biased in favor of the sort of alternatives that the manufacturer is expert at making—
or even (unintentionally) skewed by the production contractors’ technical understand-
ing of particular systems and solutions as opposed to others.
This problem was first manifest in the defense industry in a 1959 congressional investi-
gation of the relationship between TRW’s satellite and missile production businesses
and the TRW-owned Space Technology Laboratory (STL), which played a technical-
direction role in Air Force development and production projects—including some for
which TRW had submitted proposals. Neither protectors of the government trust nor
members of the defense sector that competed with TRW on those space systems con-
tracts would accept the situation, even though no specific malfeasance was uncovered
or even alleged. STL was essentially split off from TRW to become Aerospace Corpora-
tion, an independent, nonprofit, nonproduction, systems-integration specialist, later
designated an FFRDC.145 That organizational innovation, which spread with the estab-
lishment of other FFRDCs and the similarly organized “university applied research
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centers” (UARCs), allowed the military’s acquisition organizations to outsource the
technical advisory role during the Cold War in a way that was protected from conflict-
of-interest scandals.146 Some FFRDCs, like MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory, specialize in par-
ticular kinds of military-oriented research (advanced electronics, in that case),
comparable in some ways to the in-house military laboratories but more closely tied to
frontier academic research. While the core tasks of various FFRDCs overlap to some
extent, Aerospace Corporation (space systems), MITRE (air defense), and APL (naval
systems) are the ones that specialize in architecture-systems integration.147
The historical strength of FFRDCs has been their reputation for high-quality, objective
advice. Through flexibility in salary negotiations and their quasi-academic status,
FFRDCs have been able to attract high-quality personnel. Their promise not to com-
pete for production contracts and to provide equal access to all contractors while safe-
guarding proprietary information has given them unique, independent technical
capabilities.148 However, they have frequently been criticized as inefficient and relatively
expensive; while leaders of FFRDCs frequently claim that their nonprofit status allows
them to charge less than a hypothetical technically equivalent, for-profit technical advi-
sor, many others (notably leaders of for-profit firms, like SAIC) allege that the lack of a
profit motive in FFRDC work leads to inefficient performance and the potential for
featherbedding.149 Legislation currently limits the budgetary resources available to
FFRDCs and prevents the military from establishing any new ones.150
For-profit, nonproduction firms might be able to offer the benefits of FFRDCs while
avoiding the controversies linked to nonprofit status. Small engineering companies like
SYNTEK can offer technical advice to the military with a credible promise not to en-
gage in production, but it is difficult to imagine such a firm nurturing a major labora-
tory with an independent research capability and agenda, at least under current
procurement rules. Without direct access to such scientific assets, it is reasonable to
question the ability of a consultancy to maintain top-level system-of-systems integra-
tion skills.151 Larger for-profit firms like SAIC—which owns Bellcore, the former re-
search arm of the Regional Bell Operating Companies (a partial descendant of Bell
Laboratories)—offer to fill this niche, but to cover the overhead cost of such laborato-
ries they resist pressure to abstain from all production work. Although for-profit firms
in the defense industry have learned to form teams to develop major systems and
sometimes even to join a team on one contract with a firm against which they are com-
peting for another contract, real questions persist about how much proprietary data
the for-profit contractors are willing to share with one another. A promise not to en-
gage in production would allay some of the fears that prevent platform firms from be-
coming architecture-systems integrators, but major for-profit advisory firms are still
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limited by customers’ and competitors’ skepticism about their true, long-term
independence.
NCW and Systems Integration: Performance Metrics
Specific metrics for comparing systems integration capabilities have not yet been de-
fined in detail, so project managers may have difficulty selecting sources for technical
advice and deciding how much investment in up-front systems-integration work is
enough. Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute (SEI), a research
FFRDC, has developed a rating system for several information technology–related
skills, including software engineering and systems engineering. The ratings assigned ac-
cording to the SEI “capabilities maturity models” are based on a business’s commit-
ment to follow certain procedures designed to manage complex projects. Specifically,
they emphasize maintaining control of documentation and interfaces to ensure
systemwide performance as components and subsystems are improved in parallel. These
software-oriented procedures are at least related to the broader systems-integration task,
and they may provide a useful model for further work defining metrics for overall
systems-integration capabilities.152
For the purposes of this report, however, such detailed metrics for evaluating systems
integrators are not necessary. The key question in the systems-integration sector, as in
shipbuilding and unmanned vehicles, is whether the transformation to network-centric
warfare requires sustaining or disruptive innovation. If network-centric warfare builds
on established performance metrics, established SI organizations will be able to imple-
ment transformation; if new performance metrics must be applied, then new systems
organizations will be called for. Four systems-integration performance metrics require
the attention of transformation advocates.
Technical Awareness. The bedrock of systems integration is familiarity with the tech-
nical state of the art in the wide range of disciplines that contribute to the components
of the system. Systems integrators must be able to set reasonable, achievable goals for
the developers and manufacturers of system components even as they “black box” the
detailed design work for those components. If one component maker has a problem
that it can solve only at great expense but that could be solved much more easily by
changing the requirements of a different component or by altering the interface stan-
dard in a way that would cost other component manufacturers less, it is the responsi-
bility of the systems integrator to understand and implement the necessary trade-off in
the various component specifications. The more access the systems integrator has to
technical knowledge of subsystems, the better it will be able to perform that role. There
are many ways that a systems integrator can obtain this technical knowledge, including
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systematically and continuously training and educating critical engineers, hiring per-
sonnel from subsystem contractors, and seconding employees to other organizations to
work in all phases of component design and production.
Transformation is unlikely to change the role of technical awareness as a systems-
integration performance metric. To the extent that network-centric warfare draws on
unfamiliar component systems, it may strain the technical awareness of established SI
organizations. For example, emerging unmanned vehicle technologies may take over a
number of tasks previously assigned to manned systems, requiring systems integrators
to be familiar with the state of the art in UV technology if they are to make trade-offs
between manned and unmanned systems. However, the systems integrator need not
have the capability actually to design and build either the manned or the unmanned
systems. The specific technical knowledge is not the core competency for the systems
integrator; the sine qua non of systems integration is, instead, the ability to gain access
to that knowledge, by working with subsystem contractors, academic experts, or in-
house researchers.
Developing new sources and kinds of technical awareness may be the core competency
of a systems integrator, but it is only natural that the less familiar the component
technologies of a particular project are to a systems integrator, the less effective that
integrator will be. Even the organizations with the broadest architecture systems-
integration capability have specialties—Aerospace Corporation in space systems, for
example, or MITRE in command and control. It is not obvious, however, that network-
centric warfare demands new specialties. Instead, it seems to involve the advanced ap-
plication of a combination of established ones—for example, reliance on space systems
for surveillance and communications relay, on intensive exploitation of command and
control networks and battle-management computation. If a new focus on the network
characterizes the systems-integration task for network-centric warfare, MITRE, APL,
and for-profit firms like Logicon and SAIC appear to have the necessary technical
awareness. Perhaps the Software Engineering Institute’s foray into integration provides
the basis for a transition from a pure research FFRDC into a research and systems-
integration combination (akin to APL) that specializes in network technology.153 Al-
though the commercial Internet has burgeoned well beyond its defense origin, the
Arpanet, the original DARPA program has been cited as a classic example of the mili-
tary’s “systems approach” to advanced technology.154
The organizational framework through which established organizations’ specialties
should be applied to the new problems of network-centric warfare remains, however,
an open question. Various systems integrators might offer competing technical propos-
als, each offering its best system solution to network-centric warfare challenges and
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pointing out flaws in alternative proposals. American pluralist government is built on
the principle that the clash of ideas yields the best policy solutions; that clash of ideas
might help compensate for each existing organization’s implicit biases in favor of its
technical specialties. APL might point out any pitfalls of Aerospace Corporation’s
space-based solutions, while Aerospace could illuminate the risks of APL’s hypothetically
bandwidth-consuming approach. Still, it remains the responsibility of the customer/
buyer to evaluate competing claims in order to make decisions in the corporate interest
of the Navy or, better yet, of the U.S. military as a whole.
Alternatively, a team combining the relevant technical groups from the established sys-
tems integrators might be able to offer a comprehensive technical base for network-
centric systems integration. Ten FFRDCs and national laboratories combined to
provide technical support to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization through a
teaming arrangement called the Phase One Evaluation Team (POET).155 A full evalua-
tion of the technical performance of the POET is beyond the scope of this report, but
some preliminary observations are relevant. On the one hand, the POET clearly pro-
vided access to an exceptional breadth of technical talent.156 On the other hand, the
participant organizations retained their traditional customers, missions, and cultures;
they may not have invested their best resources in, or devoted their full attention to, the
missile defense effort.157 A systems-integration team for network-centric warfare would
gain similar advantages and face similar limitations.
To apply the full resources of the established systems integrators to the new challenges
of network-centric warfare, it might be advantageous to create a new systems integra-
tor with a new bureaucratic identity. But it would not be necessary to create such an
organization from scratch; it would be very costly to replicate the investment in human
capital that has already been made by established organizations. When MITRE was cre-
ated as the systems integrator for the SAGE air defense system in the late 1950s, its core
was formed from Division Six of Lincoln Laboratory, which chose at that point to fo-
cus on research rather than systems integration. MITRE then proceeded to expand its
technical awareness into new areas, integrating air defense missiles like the BOMARC
into an air defense system initially designed to cue fighter interceptors.158 Today, it
might be possible to blend various technical groups spun off by the established organi-
zations and form a new FFRDC. The new institution would maintain the well-understood
core competency in nurturing technical awareness but would do so in the service of a
new customer and organizational mission.159
Each of these three candidate organizational forms to supply systems integration for
transformation—competition among architecture integrators, a team of architecture
integrators, or a new architecture integrator—relies on the built-up skills of established
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institutions; they are evolutionary changes required to proceed with sustaining innova-
tion along the technical awareness performance metric. The financial ownership struc-
ture of the technical advisor is less important than its underlying skill base, which can
be derived from existing systems-integration groups.
Project Management Skill. Efficiency has rarely if ever been the only goal of military
acquisition programs. In addition to serving economic goals, the projects need to meet
military requirements and to satisfy political constraints.160 Nevertheless, efforts to con-
trol costs have been a continuous feature of defense policy. Warfighters would always
like to acquire more systems; technologists always can use additional resources to push
the performance envelope further; and politicians always have nondefense priorities,
including lowering taxes. Because all three groups also try to plan their expenditures as
part of the budgeting process, they need project cost and schedule estimates that are as
accurate as possible.
For complex acquisitions with numerous, heterogeneous components—a system of
systems—reliable estimates are difficult to come by, due to the vast amounts of infor-
mation that must be managed to describe the current and projected state of progress.
Participants also have incentives to hide certain information from oversight. Some-
times they believe setbacks to be temporary (that they will get back on schedule, the
promised performance trajectory, or the estimated cost projection before they have to
report problems); sometimes they fear that full disclosure will aid competitors or lead
to pressure to renegotiate fees and expropriate profits. Managers learn to report data in
favorable ways, rarely involving real malfeasance, that can give a biased picture of prog-
ress that protects ongoing projects from scrutiny.161 They also enthusiastically embrace
acquisition reform efforts and management fads that promise to reduce costs in the fu-
ture—after enough investment has been sunk into the project to lock it into the politi-
cal landscape, whether or not the efficiency benefits of the reform ever actually
materialize.162
System-of-systems integrators have the expertise to manage projects as well as possible
in the face of these constraints. The better a given systems integrator performs in that
project management task—setting accurate schedules, projecting attainable technical
goals, and minimizing transaction costs among the many organizations that have to
contribute to a systems contract—the greater the incentive the buyer has to hire that
systems integrator. Project management skill is a key performance metric for SI
organizations.
Transformation calls for sustaining innovation in project management. Ultimately, for
network-centric warfare to be useful to the warfighter, a number of different programs
(for example, ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles, munitions, and sensors) need to
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deliver compatible systems to the fleet in the correct order; the schedules need to be
timed so that the various deployment dates form the network. Cold War programs like
the Polaris fleet ballistic missile program, which required tremendous innovation in
missiles and guidance, in communications and navigation, and in submarine plat-
forms, faced the same sort of management and scheduling problems. System-of-
systems integration was effectively invented precisely for the purpose of managing such
massive, heterogeneous acquisitions.163 Network-centric warfare may require integra-
tion of an even broader array of components, making the system-of-systems integra-
tion task even more difficult. But systems integrators are already applying modern
information technology to manage complex subcontractor networks, to scan for tech-
nological leads that might contribute innovative solutions to military problems, and to
interact with potential new suppliers, innovating to support this core task.
At the platform integration level, the project management task under transformation
will be little changed from its previous incarnations. Whether any given platform inte-
grator is well positioned to participate in transformation will depend on the demand
for its technical skills—whether network-centric warfare calls for sustaining or disrup-
tive innovation in that sector of the defense industry. The platform integration task
will continue to include management of subcontractor relationships and the detailed
design of military systems. In sectors dominated by sustaining innovations, platform
integrators’ databases of successful subcontractors and procedures for working with
the social and political constraints of the government contracting environment will
contribute to successful acquisition programs. Despite acquisition reform advocates’
appropriation of phrasing from transformation advocates—the “revolution in acquisi-
tion affairs” or “revolution in business affairs”—the quest for acquisition reform is sep-
arate from military transformation.
At the architecture systems-integration level, transformation’s biggest challenge in pro-
ject management will stem from the need to integrate the plans and schedules of sev-
eral powerful customer organizations. The mechanism by which a technical direction
agent for network-centric warfare can assert control of the technical aspects of project
management may change (changes in the customer relationship will be discussed be-
low in the section on customer understanding). But the core project management task
will not change much; system-of-systems integrators will have to integrate some new
technical tasks into military systems development, but the disruptive innovations, if
any, will fall at the platform or component level rather than that of organizational and
management techniques for the system-of-systems project. Transformation requires
that high-level systems integration evolve along a familiar performance trajectory, contrib-
uting as much efficiency and scheduling accuracy to major systems acquisition as
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possible. The sustaining nature of that innovation suggests that transformation will not
change the core composition of the system-of-systems integration sector.
Perceived Independence. The key role of a system-of-systems integrator in defining
the technical requirements of various system components (and hence of the system as
a whole) requires that it be able to make trade-offs in the interest of system perfor-
mance rather than in the interest of the organizations that design or make the system.
The architecture-systems integration task is tremendously complicated; military sys-
tems have multiple goals—peak warfighting performance, sustained political support
for the acquisition program and for the national security strategy, and minimal expen-
diture of resources for acquisition, maintenance, training, and operations.164 That com-
plexity, along with the requisite technical expertise, effectively guarantees that detailed
decisions in system-of-systems integration will not be completely transparent to mili-
tary customers, congressional appropriators, or the defense industry primes and sub-
contractors that supply components of the system. All of those groups must trust
that the systems integrator has considered and protected their interests in making its
architecture-definition decisions; any organizations that feel that their trust has been
violated are in a position to create a scandal by complaining publicly. They are con-
strained, however, by the understanding that complaining too often or too loudly can
subvert the entire process of providing for the national defense. They cooperated in the
Cold War evolution of system-of-systems integrators in ways that minimized the prob-
lem of bias in system definition, and that lack of bias is today a key performance metric
for system-of-systems integrators.
The difficulty in maintaining independence for architecture systems integration is
compounded by the pecuniary incentives in defense acquisition. Like all organizations,
systems integrators have an incentive to favor solutions that maximize their own orga-
nizational rewards, maintaining and exploiting their positions as key nodes, connecting
customers and producers in the organizational network of the military-industrial com-
plex.165 This bias may be purely tacit, such as that by which scientists propose certain
types of technical solutions based on their particular expertise, thereby reinforcing the
value of that particular expertise. It may also be structural: profits in the defense indus-
try have disproportionately accrued to production rather than research or technical
advisory organizations, in large part because profits are regulated, formally and infor-
mally, at a certain percentage of project revenue, and the bulk of the acquisition spend-
ing is concentrated during the procurement rather than the systems development
phases.166 Further, in the post–Cold War threat environment, wherein the United States
faces no peer competitor, firms having “critical masses” of workers (generally produc-
tion rather than technical organizations) have been able to add considerable political
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weight to their pleas for financial support from congressional appropriators.167 Conse-
quently, the financial prospects for pure system-of-systems integrators are weak, and
they face pressure to incorporate systems integration vertically into production capa-
bility. Freedom to choose optimal technical solutions is constantly threatened at the
margin by the bureaucratic interests of the services and the political power of platform
producers. Because this pressure is well known, trust from the customers that the sys-
tems integrators will protect the military’s interests and not simply their own material
interests, is also threatened.
Bias is built into the very makeup of most established systems-integration houses. They
originally served particular customers, and the needs of that customer were well
known. Lack of bias in this context meant that within their own issue domains they
might reasonably be expected to play the honest broker. In turf battles with external
forces, however, they might favor particular types of solutions. Thus Aerospace Corpo-
ration might be unbiased in telling the Air Force about how to organize and equip its
own space capabilities, but less so when arguing for space-based solutions as opposed
to nonspace-based approaches proposed by other government entities.
By and large, the FFRDC/UARC system of nonproduction technical advisors func-
tioned successfully during the Cold War.168 The contractual relationships of FFRDCs
and UARCs with the government commit them not to engage in production. Some de-
gree of tension inevitably remains between the producer firms and the FFRDCs, who
insist that they need to engage in prototype building that is quite similar to production
in order to maintain their SI skills. Such tension seems particularly likely to escalate in
the software industry, where the development and production phases of a code-writing
project frequently overlap.
APL, for example, has gotten into trouble for mixing production with systems inte-
gration, specifically in the current dispute over the best technology for the Navy’s
Cooperative Engagement Capability. Solipsys, a software firm founded recently by
disenchanted former employees of APL, has created a rival system, the Tactical Compo-
nent Network (TCN). Solipsys claims that the Navy has not given it a fair hearing, at
least in part because APL is both the technical advisor to the Navy and the developer of
CEC. Regardless of the technical merits of CEC versus TCN, and here opinions vary
widely,169 the controversy would be less bitter if APL were not exposed to charges that it
favors one solution over the other because it developed that alternative and would par-
ticipate in its production. The Navy, which will have to decide between the two ap-
proaches for its Block 2 acquisition of CEC in 2004, has a real problem evaluating the
technical claims of the competing organizations.170 Even if the Navy finds a way to
make the technically correct decision, conflict-of-interest claims will arise—as they
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already have—and the likely outcome will be extra oversight of the CEC program, in-
creasing costs and undermining political support for that key early procurement step
in developing the Navy’s common operational picture, which is required for network-
centric warfare.
Scandals alleging “waste, fraud, and abuse” and cost and schedule failures have derailed
military investment in the past, and conflicts of interest might be a threat to the Navy’s
move toward network-centric warfare. The peaks in the major cycles of the U.S. Cold
War defense budget were associated with procurement scandals, which at least superfi-
cially played a role in reversing the defense budget trend. Even if, at the time, structural
factors like the changing threat environment or the completion of a generational
change in key equipment were bringing the procurement cycle to an end, calls to rein
in defense-acquisition abuses were a proximate cause of the downturn in the defense
budget.171 The Future Years Defense Budget now calls for a major increase in procure-
ment spending for the next several years—the defense budget’s new cycle. If the mili-
tary leadership hopes to use that spending to develop and acquire the systems to
implement transformation, the cycle must not end prematurely in scandal.
Military transformation relies on sustaining innovation to meet the metric of “per-
ceived independence” for system-of-systems integration performance. Some of the
Navy’s technical advisors for whom lack of bias was a key core competency during the
Cold War have actually begun to stray from that trajectory, under pressure to defend
sunk investment in particular technical approaches or to increase revenues by exploit-
ing “industrial funding” privileged by recent acquisition reform. Those post–Cold War
pressures might have been disruptive; the 1990s cutbacks among the nonproduction
technical advisors may reflect the effects of disruptive innovation that over time would
have revamped the industrial base for system-of-systems integration. The best way to
implement network-centric warfare would be to return to the well-known “lack of
bias” performance trajectory as soon as possible, while suitable organizations still exist
with core competencies to proceed with system-of-systems integration.
Customer Understanding. The Navy, with all its communities (primarily the three led,
respectively, by aviators, submariners, and surface warfare officers), is a complicated
organization with a long institutional history, unique traditions, and organizational bi-
ases developed over generations of operational experience. More formally, there is a
large body of strategy, tactics, doctrine, and training processes that distinguish the
Navy from the other services, from other government agencies, and from the private
sector. The other services and supporting intelligence organizations have similarly de-
veloped organizational identities and perspectives on warfighting and national security
strategy.172 The success of each system-of-systems integrator depends on how deeply it
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understands the naval and military environments, because the integration organiza-
tion’s architecture definitions and project management decisions must serve its cus-
tomer’s true goals, which can be difficult to articulate in a simple, program-specific,
“statement of objectives.” Navy-oriented systems integrators (for example, APL,
SYNTEK, and Lockheed Martin Naval Electronics and Surveillance Systems) have built
up a great deal of tacit knowledge about how and why the Navy operates, knowledge
without which they would not be trusted to perform system-of-systems integration.
Customer understanding is important for any organization, but it is a uniquely vital
performance metric for architecture systems-integration organizations.
Customer understanding is a moving target; long experience alone is insufficient. A
systems integrator must commit itself to invest continuously in its military-operational
knowledge base. It must monitor lessons learned from recent exercises and operational
deployments, as well as changes in military doctrine and national grand strategy, in or-
der to maintain the “right” kind of technical awareness. Ideally, members of the SI or-
ganization should participate in war games and exercises wherein the Navy tests new
operational concepts and introduces virtual prototypes of future platforms and subsys-
tems. Teaming in various forms can only help personnel and organizations develop a
greater appreciation for mutual idiosyncrasies. A large part of customer understanding
is the maintenance over time of interorganizational relationships that transcend indi-
viduals and projects.
Unfortunately, customer understanding might also reinforce institutional inertia and
reify the status quo; in many ways, it is analogous to bureaucratic “capture,” as a result
of which a regulator sees things from the perspective of industry rather than the public
interest. Yet these dangers are not best avoided by creating firewalls or by artificially in-
troducing change from the outside. Rather both the customer and the SI organization
must self-consciously distinguish between customer understanding for the sake of
overall success and collaboration for the sake of blocking change or protecting institu-
tional interests. In short, the systems integrator must be free (and protected) to resolve
trade-offs in ways that may harm short-term customer interests but guard the long-
term health of the organization as a whole.
The need to make trade-offs and provide analyses of alternatives that may threaten ex-
isting programs and the short-term plans of system-of-systems integrators’ customers
puts SI organizations in a delicate position. Individual services are wary of criticism
and fear losing ground in budgetary competition with other services, just as individual
platform makers may resent the oversight that an independent systems integrator exer-
cises on particular projects, even while understanding its necessity for the overall
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success of national defense investment. System-of-systems integrators’ customers must
be confident that the systems integrator has their true interests at heart.173
At the architecture systems-integration level, transformation’s biggest challenge lies in
the fact that the system-of-systems crosses many organizational boundaries. This re-
quirement is especially severe in the more expansive visions of transformation that
emphasize network-centric warfare as a joint rather than a service undertaking.
Communities within the services have strong, independent identities, ideas about how
wars should be fought, and priorities for setting schedules and allocating funding. Each
service, in turn, tries to influence the course of transformation—and to influence the
definition of the system-of-systems by pushing preferred definitions of the trade space
and by defending and funding particular programs that the overall systems integrator
must then integrate into the network-centric force structure. Architecture systems inte-
grators will have to understand and balance the conflicting motivations of the several
customers, most of which have great difficulty incorporating multiple goals into their
organizational identities.174 These considerations suggest that a truly joint systems ap-
proach may require establishment of a single, joint acquisition agency to which a single
system-of-systems integrator could be attached. However, added organizational layers
between integrators and their service customers, who will actually operate military sys-
tems, might degrade customer understanding, reducing the effectiveness of analysis of
alternatives. Adopting a single buyer for transformational systems might also threaten
the diversity of approaches that interservice rivalry could otherwise provide.
Service visions of transformation will require that system-of-systems integration orga-
nizations pursue sustaining innovation in customer understanding, building on estab-
lished communications channels to the fleet, doctrine developers, and the acquisition
community. System-of-systems organizations now at home serving particular subsets
of the military may have difficulty developing contact networks and perfecting cus-
tomer understanding at the “higher” level system-of-systems integration environ-
ment—for example, a firm supporting only space systems that finds that both space
and terrestrial systems now need to be analyzed as alternatives within the network. A
meaningful, joint transformation vision will require a more disruptive innovation tra-
jectory for system-of-systems integration in the way that jointness routinely requires
disruptive innovation, squeezing out established organizations and suppliers. However,
much as established architecture systems integrators have the skills to expand technical
awareness into new areas, those organizations also have the skills to focus on develop-
ing customer awareness as a means of staying in business. Transformation does not
change the organizational goal of customer understanding, but organizational bound-
aries will be at least as difficult—likely more difficult—to overcome than interdisci-
plinary boundaries in technical awareness.
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Sector Evaluation
Transformation relies explicitly on intense interoperability, one of the key components
of system-of-systems integration; accordingly, transformation and systems integration
have become tied together in a very public way. At this early stage of transformation,
however, another component of system-of-systems integration is even more impor-
tant—trade-off studies to establish the objectives and requirements for the component
systems that will be acquired as nodes and network elements.
Certain established systems-integration houses, like APL and MITRE, clearly have ex-
pertise that is closely related to present plans for network-centric warfare, and they
should play major parts in the network-centric defense industry. Similarly, some of the
production-oriented prime contractors have high-level systems-integration groups
that on technical awareness and project management grounds might join the nucleus
of competitive SI suppliers. However, in the face of commitments to sustaining innova-
tion in terms of the lack-of-bias and customer-understanding performance metrics,
prime contractors’ skills are more likely to be optimally applied in the service of plat-
form rather than in architecture systems integration.175 Given the predominance of sus-
taining innovations in the systems-integration sector’s part of transformation, the key
step in preparing the defense industrial base for network-centric warfare is not to try
to change the cast of characters but to update and focus the technical emphasis of the
Navy’s own acquisition community.
There is no reason to invite platform-making prime contractors into the systems-
integration sector as part of transformation. The primes want in because they perceive
that systems integration is “where the money is,” at least in the short term; they per-
ceive it as the locus of greatest responsibility in the future defense industry. Moreover,
as political pressure builds in support of transformation, and systems that are not per-
ceived as transformational (like the Army’s Crusader self-propelled howitzer) become
vulnerable to cancellation, prime contractors are looking for ways to link their activi-
ties to transformation. The logic for the primes is the same as it always has been: if a
particular kind of acquisition reform is popular, your programs should be “demonstra-
tors” of the new technique; if systems analysis and PERT charts are the way to show
budget and schedule control, your programs should use them; if network-centric war-
fare is the future operational concept, your programs should emphasize their
connectivity.
Acting as a systems-integration agent might be the best protection of all for a prime
contractor’s business base. Production firms in the defense sector might be expected to
complain about outside systems-integration houses’ role on particular projects, be-
cause the advisor’s job includes raising awkward criticisms of the prime contractors’
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technical approaches and production skills. One way to avoid such criticism would be
to make systems integration part of the prime’s job. However, given the importance of
independence for quality systems integration and the fact that up-front technical ad-
vice and coordination will help to keep transformation programs on schedule and
budget, production contractors should find it in their interest to support outside SI
organizations (especially if paid mostly from the military infrastructure budget rather
than from specific projects’ budgets).
On the other hand, it remains very difficult for the Navy to choose its technical advi-
sors for system-of-systems integration, because systems-integration performance met-
rics are difficult to operationalize and tie to the traditional framework for defense
contracting. No top-down metric that is developed for systems-integration skill will be
able to substitute for organizational competition. The various systems-integration or-
ganizations can offer a diversity of technical approaches and system-of-systems pro-
posals, and they can offer technical commentary on and critiques of each other’s
proposals, giving the military customer enough advice to make informed choices early
in the transformation process. The consolidation of the defense industrial sector
through mergers and the reduced post–Cold War demand for long production runs
has limited competition for production contracts; the overhead cost of maintaining
multiple production lines for each weapon system is also unacceptably high, even in
the current defense budget environment. However, competition among technical advi-
sory organizations—each with a different design philosophy or technical focus—is rel-
atively inexpensive to sustain, and those dedicated systems integrators should be able
to help monitor technical efficiency during the production phase of the acquisition
process. Meanwhile, in competing for their shares of the technical advisory role during
the upcoming military transformation, these organizations will monitor each other’s
performance, point out technical flaws in competitors’ proposals, and help decide how
and how much to invest in systems integration. Exploiting competition among dedi-
cated SI organizations should be a relatively low-cost response to the tension between
budgetary pressure and the high resource demand of investing in military transforma-
tion. In the end, however, the buck must stop somewhere. Competition among systems-
integration organizations may keep everyone honest and allow ideas to be triaged, but
the Navy itself must sort through competing claims and make decisions.
Major acquisition projects or groups of related projects during the Cold War often
spawned new procurement and advisory organizations. A new acquisition organization/
systems integrator partnership might now facilitate the Navy’s transformation effort.
Advocates of network-centric warfare frequently note that the current acquisition
system is organized on a platform-by-platform basis, which naturally deemphasizes
crucial network investment. The potential problem is very much akin to the barriers to
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investment in missile defense through traditional acquisition channels that led in the
1980s to the creation of the Strategic Defense Initiative Office, predecessor of the Bal-
listic Missile Defense Office. The Navy should consider giving network-centric warfare
a similar home in a new acquisition organization that will develop a bureaucratic inter-
est in acting as the budgetary advocate for transformation. Because the network is in-
tended at least to link systems from all of the communities within the Navy, this new
organization would report directly to the highest echelon of Navy acquisition decision
making, the Secretary of the Navy.
The new organization could also take responsibility for supporting a new technical ad-
visory organization that will develop expertise specifically in the network and node re-
quirements for the Navy after Next. This organization will, in all likelihood, borrow
personnel and even intellectual capital (for example, lessons-learned databases) from
existing systems integrators as well as develop new competencies necessary to handle
the complexities of the network-centric environment. Any such new systems integrator
would need a high-level sponsor, a reasonable budget, insulation from the inevitable
bureaucratic infighting, and, most of all, time to develop the trusted relationships and
track record of success that characterize systems-integration houses. The political pres-
sure behind transformation may not be able to wait that long. In the case of the Reagan-
era surge in funding for missile defenses, a new acquisition organization was created
because the bureaucratic identities of the services’ systems commands diverted their
efforts from missile defenses into traditional systems; however, technical support for
the missile defense systems’ diverse components fundamentally relied on systems-
integration skills that were available from established organizations. As a result, the
POET, composed of the established systems-integration houses, provided effective
technical support.
In the current policy environment, the balance is tipping away from dedicated systems-
integration houses like FFRDCs and the technically skilled professional service corpo-
rations, and toward prime contractors that build platforms. If the military services
succeed in reversing that trend and creating a POET-like team for network-centric sys-
tems integration, perhaps that should be considered enough of a victory. It would
provide at least minimal protection from scandal that might derail the information-
technology revolution in military affairs. Despite the questions that some have raised
about whether the POET optimized technical support for missile defense, a POET-like
team for network-centric warfare might well make important strides toward improving
the technical future of the American way of war.
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Conclusion
Our conclusions and recommendations, based on nearly two years of research and
hundreds of interviews with defense industry executives, government officials, policy
analysts, and scholars, focus on (1) the defense industrial implications of military
transformation and (2) how to ensure industry support for transformation. In both
areas we make recommendations to help the Navy and DoD as a whole achieve trans-
formation in partnership with both Congress and industry. Our intention here, as in
the rest of the report, is not to advocate transformation per se. Rather, we seek to ex-
amine the conditions under which transformation might be successful when, and if,
the U.S. Navy, the other military services, and the Department of Defense seriously
commit themselves to adopting and implementing a new vision of warfighting.
The Defense Industry and Military Transformation
Many of our findings run contrary to recent analyses of military transformation and of
the current and likely future state of the defense industrial base. We do not find per-
suasive most of the mantras of transformation advocates. The defense industry is not
going to disappear. Commercial information technology firms will not displace defense
sector primes as the major suppliers of equipment and expertise to the next military or
the military after next. Innovation will proceed apace with or without significant
commercial-sector participation, providing the military can decide upon the goals of
transformational innovation. Systems-integration organizations will be able to trans-
late goals into requirements, and platform integrators will be able to develop and pro-
duce the detailed equipment designs.
Nor do we share many of the current concerns about the health of defense firms. Re-
cent anxiety about the profitability, or lack thereof, of defense firms were more an arti-
fact of the “dot-com” bubble and the first crest of the “new economy” than evidence of
problems within the defense industry itself. While some firms have exited the defense
business, others have focused more closely on defense; such firms have done remark-
ably well for their shareholders in the last year or so. While access to international
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markets could be improved, the simple fact remains that the U.S. R&D and procure-
ment budgets are by far the largest prize in the global defense business. If anything,
foreign defense firms will have trouble surviving without access to the American
marketplace; American defense firms are more able to survive, if not thrive, in a frag-
mented international marketplace. Neither profitability nor globalization is a key issue
or challenge for the implementation of transformation visions.
At the highest level of generality, we do not believe that military transformation will re-
quire wholesale defense industrial transformation. Traditional defense suppliers have
provided the United States with military capabilities unparalleled in world history;
they will continue to do so far into the future. Calls to purge the term “defense indus-
trial base” from our lexicon in favor of simply “industrial base” do not take account of
the unique characteristics of the firms that provide weapons and systems to the U.S.
military. Defense firms have numerous competencies—from experience interacting
with the military culture to the administrative infrastructure necessary to meet unique
government regulations—that are not found elsewhere within the American economy.
Simply having the administrative mechanisms in place to deal with the complexities of
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations, for example, constitutes a core competency
that is not, and cannot be, duplicated by most potential commercial entrants into the
defense business. Even acquisition reforms will not change the importance of these
competencies; the so-called revolution in business affairs will only go so far toward
making federal contracting similar to its civilian counterpart. Congressional represen-
tatives and, indeed, the federal workforce as a whole demand a higher level of transpar-
ency, fairness, and accountability than is fundamentally compatible with standard
commercial business practices.
This is not to argue that no changes within the defense industrial sector or the govern-
ment’s acquisition system will occur. In some specific niches, nontraditional suppliers
will play roles in military acquisition in the future. They are highly unlikely, however,
to displace General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, or the
other established prime contractors. On the government side, there also may be a great
deal of tinkering at the margins—with changes in the Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstrations system, export controls, and dual-use technology regulations, for ex-
ample—perhaps even a major acquisition reform effort by Congress. The DoD leader-
ship has pushed for numerous reforms and aggressively advocated a revolution in
business affairs to reform both its own internal procedures and its relationship with the
private sector. In the end, however, the basic premises that have led the United States to
today’s acquisition system, however Byzantine, remain valid.
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A principal finding of our research is that it is less helpful to discuss the defense indus-
trial base as a whole than it is to focus on specific sectors providing particular types of
capabilities and the proposed roles for particular sectors in transformation visions.
Many of our findings are sector specific.
Shipbuilding
The network-centric vision, if fully realized, suggests that it is not simply networks but
the nature of the nodes (read “platforms”) that must change. If the NCW vision is
adopted in its most robust form, the Navy should soon be buying smaller, less complex
ships that are designed to operate in a highly complex, fully networked, system of sys-
tems. Warships will no longer serve as multipurpose vessels equipped to operate on
their own. They will instead be most effective as specialized components of much
larger systems.
This vision must be tempered by two realities. First, large, multipurpose warships are
unlikely to disappear from the fleet any time soon. Legacy systems, from nuclear-
powered aircraft carriers to DDG 51 destroyers to SSNs, will remain in the fleet for sev-
eral generations. Further, most transformation advocates acknowledge that their views
do not envision changing the nature and composition of the entire military. Often
drawing on analogies to the transformation achieved by Nazi Germany’s armed forces
that enabled the adoption of blitzkrieg tactics, they suggest that roughly 10 percent of
the current force needs to be transformed. Second, potentially innovative shipbuilding
programs, even if they focus on affordability, remain very expensive, a factor that will
limit the rate of deployment of new ship classes.
Christensen’s innovation framework suggests that some nontraditional suppliers will
enter the defense industrial base—depending, of course, on the specific performance
metrics the Navy adopts as it winds its way through the acquisition cycle for programs
like the DD(X), especially the LCS component of that program. Yet this possibility may
be undercut by the nature of the relationship between the Navy customer and the po-
tential shipbuilding competitors. As in all defense industrial sectors, established suppli-
ers enjoy many advantages over their commercial and international competitors. They
have long-standing and relatively successful business relationships with the Navy and
the other services dating back for decades. They have invested heavily in understanding
the needs of the Navy, both by hiring retired naval officers and by closely monitoring
the decision-making processes in Washington. Finally, they maintain large and active
lobbying organizations to ensure that the obvious benefits of preserving existing firms
(and their facilities) remain at the forefront of public debates. All this suggests that
even if it makes sense for firms like Bender, Bollinger, or Halter Marine to participate
M I L I T A R Y T R A N S F O R M A T I O N 7 9
in the production of transformational naval ships, they would in all likelihood do so in
partnership with larger shipyards or other platform integrators.
UAVs
Network-centric warfare relies heavily on UAVs both as nodes (e.g., combatants, in the
form of UCAVs, and carriers of various sensor suites) and as parts of the overarching
net (e.g., communications relays) linking various commands and components together
into the “global information grid.” Even more than in shipbuilding, it is impossible to
identify the performance metrics that will establish what constitutes a successful UAV
and which firms can be expected to produce such craft. Most experts with whom we
discussed UAVs were unable to articulate what distinguishes UAVs from other possible
ways of accomplishing various missions or what makes one UAV design better than its
competitors. Many of our informants, clearly, had not thought through performance-
metrics issues.
Based on our efforts to understand the emerging UAV sector, there again seems to be
little reason to believe that new firms will suddenly develop disruptive technologies—
say, propulsion systems or aircraft control systems—that will allow them to attract new
customers or undermine existing products (and their producers). There is a fairly large
number of firms developing and producing UAVs today (and even more that have re-
cently produced prototypes and demonstrators) that are already firmly ensconced in
the traditional defense industrial sector; the list includes Boeing, General Atomics, and
Northrop Grumman’s Ryan Aeronautical. To a greater or lesser extent, each of these
firms (with its second-tier competitors, such as AAI) is currently producing sustaining
innovations and scanning the technology horizon for firms or ideas that can improve
the performance of its products. It seems unlikely that they will be surprised by the
work of start-ups. Even if they are, a rational response to technological surprise would
be to acquire or license the new technology and incorporate it into proven manufactur-
ing and marketing systems.
Yet the possibility of disruptive innovation remains, because the performance metrics
for UAVs are neither well established nor well understood. In theory, over time, new
standards that undermine today’s market leaders might emerge. This observation may
be especially true with regard to the Navy; one potential upside to the Navy’s off-and-
on relationship with UAVs is that the door remains open to new firms and new tech-
nologies. The Navy has not yet settled on one particular course. Further, because naval
UAVs (at least those designed to be deployed with the fleet) may have unique perfor-
mance constraints—launch and recovery systems or marinization, for instance—this
portion of the sector may be ripe for disruption.
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Moreover, some of today’s UAV manufacturers have had rocky relations with their naval
customers. General Atomics has been unsuccessful in its efforts to market its Predator
series to the Navy; the firm’s officials suggest that this failure stems from Navy hostility
to UAVs in general. Northrop Grumman’s Global Hawk has been plagued by technical
glitches and cost overruns. In short, the relatively long-standing customer-supplier re-
lations that are in place may not remain entrenched if credible alternative suppliers
emerge.
Systems Integration
If network-centric warfare or, indeed, any approach to future warfighting is to succeed,
systems integration—rather than platforms and even networks, per se—must be a high
priority, both organizationally and financially. There are many obstacles to investing in
systems integration, however. In Congress, systems integration has weak political sup-
port, because systems integration projects do not employ as many people as do plat-
form programs, let alone in such concentrations as in Groton, Newport News, or
Pascagoula. Systems integration often also has weak support from industry, because,
under traditional business models, industry profits come from production rather than
front-end research and development or maintenance. Systems integrators may even
have an adversarial relationship with platform builders on any given program (when
they do their job right, systems integrators critique contractor performance and rec-
ommend trade-offs that threaten primes and their suppliers). When a systems integra-
tor is also a prime or part of a vertically integrated firm with multiple divisions, the
government should fear that it may not receive optimal solutions. As one of its com-
petitors put it, “When you ask General Dynamics a question, you may well receive a
General Dynamics answer.”176
Buying adequate systems-integration expertise is a responsibility of the services and
DoD during the transformation process. However, since it is difficult to find well-
recognized metrics to choose high-quality SI organizations, it is difficult to decide how
much funding for systems integrators is enough. As discussed above, a variety of firms
and types of firms will play roles in systems integration; it may very well be that to get
the level of systems integration they require, DoD or the Navy will need to create a new
organization with systems-of-systems integration responsibilities, much as the Strate-
gic Defense Initiative Office was created in the 1980s to overcome organizational obsta-
cles to investment in missile defense. This system-of-systems organization should
probably report to the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the Navy if it is to have
the authority necessary to make integration a priority within the service. It must also
have oversight over the wide range of Navy acquisition programs—from ships to UAVs
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to aircraft—in order to make and enforce key decisions regarding architecture,
trade-offs, and interface standards.
If DoD or even the Navy itself creates a new acquisition organization for system-of-
systems integration, in all likelihood technical and professional assistance from a private-
sector contractor will be required. It would be difficult to stand up a new governmental
organization with all the technical expertise implied by the performance metrics dis-
cussed in the systems-integration section of this report. The type of support organiza-
tion that would make the most sense has yet to be determined, but our initial judgment
is that an FFRDC or an organization of that kind would be a leading candidate.
FFRDCs have long histories of success in supporting large-scale projects with heteroge-
neous components; more to the point, FFRDCs avoid, by statute and design, many per-
ceived conflicts of interest, have the resources to hire skilled personnel, and can develop
the requisite customer relationships and technical competencies.
Transforming the Navy
When we began our research, few industry officials—and perhaps even fewer naval of-
ficers—understood the meaning of network-centric warfare and its implications for
the future of the Navy. Today, NCW and its associated concepts are part of the daily
discourse. As our earlier review of the military vision debate demonstrated, the Navy,
the military as a whole, and even Congress have increasingly accepted the concepts of
network-centric operations. Yet getting the terminology right is not enough.
For naval transformation to succeed, the Navy itself must rally behind its transforma-
tion vision. Specifically, the various naval communities and commands must support
NCW by making the resource allocation choices necessary to support transformation.
If they do, firms will determine their future business strategies on the basis, at least in
part, of these new clues about their customer’s future acquisition strategy. Firms will
not, however, focus their internal R&D investments, technology search patterns,
merger and acquisition plans, or personnel decisions on transformation before their
customer has committed itself to it. Military transformation must be customer rather
than supplier driven.
Elements of the Navy that do not understand or believe in the potential benefits of
NCW may pay lip service to the terminology but fail to shift their ideas, personnel, and
funding. Their reluctance would impede transformation by encouraging stovepiped
programs, allowing projects that do not embody NCW principles and performance
metrics to continue, and generally undermining efforts to enact major changes in how
the Navy does business. Faced with mixed clues, firms will have few incentives to
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reorient themselves. They will have more reason to continue existing programs and
maintain their cozy relations with traditional customers.
Ideally, the needs of the current Navy, the Next Navy, and the Navy after Next must be
deconflicted. Especially in the current environment of an ongoing global war on terror,
immediate operational requirements often bump up against projects with payoffs that
will be realized much farther out in the future. Such conflicts are so pervasive that they
could retard the ability of the Navy to respond to calls for transformation. The readi-
ness of today’s fleet and programs for the next one thus threaten the foundation of the
one after that. Tension among these three navies will undoubtedly be evident well into
the future.
A large portion of the fleet in the Navy after Next will consist of the “legacy” platforms
of today’s Navy and the Next Navy; it must be able to work with the new platforms de-
veloped for the Navy after Next. Contractors like Raytheon are researching ways to im-
prove connectivity among the various generations of platforms, weapons, and sensors
that exist now and will soon join the fleet. Yet program managers often have trouble
finding institutional sponsors to fund such projects. Such small-scale interoperability
programs are often orphans that must be pushed by industry rather than pulled by the
acquisition side. It is even more troubling, however, that no one—neither contractors,
the Navy laboratories, nor the Navy systems commands—appears to be systematically
thinking through the large-scale system-of-systems architecture questions facing an
NCW Navy. For example, what, if any, systems-design problems are inherent in over-
laying an expeditionary sensor grid over existing and proposed spaced-based sensor
systems? What are the trade-offs inherent in “shifting complexity”—in NCW lan-
guage—from nodes to the network?
At an even higher level of generality, there are also conflicts between technological op-
timists and observers more skeptical of the scientific and engineering promise of many
projects proposed for the Navy after Next. The danger exists that senior decision mak-
ers will seek to reap the technological promise of the Navy after Next prematurely—
making it impossible to maintain interface control and systemwide documentation,
and diverting resources from the planning of an optimal NCW system. Others expect
dramatic decreases in program costs based on a promised revolution in business affairs
and dramatic gains in manufacturing productivity. Overselling may make established
but not-yet-in-production programs for the Next Navy less able to survive test failures
or developmental delays that cost the taxpayers money or the services time. Already the
rush to deploy Predators and Global Hawks in Afghanistan before they had completed
OT&E has proved to be a double-edge sword; while both platforms have demonstrated
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their usefulness, they have suffered failures that have led some to question the future of
UAVs generally.
Program difficulties that lead to cancellations or sharply decreased funding (resulting
in smaller buys or extensions) may increase the resistance of the traditional defense in-
dustry to transformation strategies. After all, General Dynamics’ Electric Boat, among
others, was burned by the abrupt cancellation of the Seawolf; virtually the entire range
of Navy contractors felt betrayed by the Navy’s management approach to, and ultimate
cancellation of, the Arsenal Ship program. Today some grumble about the recent fate
of DD-21 (though the official line is that the DD[X] family of ships will incorporate
much of the work done for DD-21). As for transformational programs, several indus-
try executives we met with argued that the Navy had botched its UAV programs by fail-
ing to move from prototypes to production, by demanding unreasonable performance
from immature technologies, and by commissioning “studies” rather than buying real
prototypes.
In view of past problems, naval transformation will require careful management of the
Navy’s political relationships with Congress and industry. Congress may well be reluc-
tant to commit to new, potentially expensive programs in view of fiscal realities and the
vocal service, industry, and public constituencies that surround existing programs.
Even the increases related to September 11 have not relieved pressure to divert re-
sources from investment for the future into current consumption by operational
forces. In this uncertain budgetary environment, political, organizational, and bureau-
cratic strategies matter.
The Navy should be wary of overpromising the cost-saving benefits of acquisition re-
form, mergers and acquisitions, new manufacturing technologies, and various per-
formance metrics for its systems. For example, when General Dynamics claimed that
it could save some two billion dollars if it acquired Newport News Shipyard, many
were rightly skeptical.177 If projected savings from industry consolidations and man-
agement reforms do not materialize, the Navy will be forced to make unpleasant
choices and may lose credibility needed in the future. Political deals could leave pro-
grams underfunded in the out-years and increase the possibility that a program will
be canceled.178 The same holds true for the reputed savings from UAVs and platforms
with reduced manning. Already the military has seen the cost of UAVs escalate,179 and
personnel removed from a DD(X) destroyer or the LCS may simply be assigned
elsewhere.
Linking transformation to operational requirements—from changes in the strategic
environment to changes in potential adversaries’ technological sophistication or mili-
tary preparations—will also help maintain momentum toward transformation.180 Indeed,
8 4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
this appears to be part of the Bush administration’s overall strategy. Programs and re-
forms that will presumably aid in the war on terror are deemed “transformational” and
are thus popular. This dynamic is especially clear with regard to UAVs; supporters have
hailed UAV successes and downplayed their failures both to increase funding and to
overcome cultural resistance within some segments of the military. Neither Congress
nor the public will be keen to answer charges that it did not prepare sufficiently for the
next major threat to the security of America or its allies.
Conversely, setting technological requirements for transformation based on the speed
and level of technological progress in commercial markets will make planning for
NCW largely a reactive exercise, one that does not emphasize core Navy competencies.
Decisions may thus be ceded to politicians, salesmen, or scientists and engineers. Al-
though Congress may be generally sympathetic to new technologies, members are sen-
sitive to employment levels and federal expenditures in key districts. There appears to
be little need to refresh technologies at the rate maintained by some parts of the com-
mercial sector or to worry about “Moore’s Law” writ large. Given what we know about
the resources available to our allies and potential allies (including their defense indus-
trial capabilities), as well as those of adversaries and potential adversaries, if the U.S.
Navy, or the military generally, adopts the commercial sector as its model, it will in the
end be racing against itself, disrupting the fleet unnecessarily, and eroding public good-
will through disproportionate spending for marginal improvements.
Even if the Navy overcomes internal resistance to transformation, and even if its rela-
tionship with the defense industrial sector differs from the usual commercial customer-
supplier relationship in ways that will facilitate development of the Navy after Next,
network-centric warfare may still be derailed. Procurement of modern weapon systems
increasingly strains the Navy’s capabilities in technology acquisition. Buyers need to
know what to buy, from whom to buy it, and what price to pay; technology develop-
ment, however, is not a core competency of the Navy, at least not to the extent that it is
of the technology-oriented firms that meet most demands for innovations. Opera-
tional requirements must be translated from “statements of objectives” into specific
project plans for which the acquisition community can write contracts. The Navy
needs a way to make sure that these technological requirements are attainable with rea-
sonable investments of time and resources. For these reasons the Navy must have access
to the core competencies of specialized systems integration and technology manage-
ment houses.
This is especially true in that congressional politics and the Navy’s comfort level with
traditional contractors argue for maintaining relationships with the established defense-
industrial sector. The long-standing relationships that exist between members and
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industry are based on a powerful confluence of money and electoral politics. If the
transition to NCW threatens established sectors of the defense industrial base, Con-
gress can and will make it politically difficult to move forward with the new programs
and the cancellations necessary to achieve an NCW future; the Army’s resistance to ter-
minating the Crusader artillery system suggests just how costly political battles are for
all parties—the services, DoD, Congress, and, ultimately, firms whose work may be cut.
Given appropriate incentives, however, the defense industrial sector is fully capable of
supporting transformation, implementing it with sustaining innovations and joint
ventures that combine start-ups’ disruptive innovations with established firms’ cus-
tomer understanding. The United States should be able to buy the Navy after Next
without bankrupting the current defense firms.
When and where transformation could be viewed as a threat to the business bases of
defense industrial firms, they can and will exert powerful lobbying pressure to delay or
divert transformation. Any individual firms that can be persuaded to favor transforma-
tion, and certainly the defense industry as a whole, would be powerful allies in building
political and budgetary support. Therefore, innovators inside the military must join
forces with innovators in Congress and industry to push the transformation agenda
forward.
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Government and Nongovernment Interviews
Government Interviews
Army Science Board
Congressional Budget Office
Congressional Research Service
DARPA
Information Systems Office
Tactical Technology Office
Defence Evaluation Research Agency, U.K.
Defense Contract Management Agency
Industrial Analysis Center
Defense Systems Management College
Department of Commerce
Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security, Bureau of Export
Administration
Department of the Navy
Chief Technology Officer
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, &
Acquisition)
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University
NAVAIR
NAVSEA
Innovation Center, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division
Shipbuilding Technologies Department, NSWC, Carderock Division
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
Navy Warfare Development Command
NAWCWD, China Lake
Office of Naval Research
Industrial and Corporate Programs Office
International Field Office, Asia
Office of the Chief Scientist
Office of the Executive Director
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Advanced Systems and Concepts
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)
Industrial Capabilities and Assessments Directorate
Interoperability
OpNav, N-911
SPAWAR Headquarters, San Diego
SPAWAR Systems Center San Diego
Swedish Defence Research Agency
U.S. Joint Forces Command
Nongovernment Interviews
Aerospace Corporation
ANSER
Anteon Corporation
Applied Physics Laboratory
Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International
BAE Systems
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University
Boeing
Phantom Works
Washington Studies and Analysis
Bollinger Shipyards, Inc.
Booz Allen Hamilton
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Capital Synergy Partners
Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute
Cherokee Information Systems
Friede Goldman Halter, Halter Marine, Inc.
General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.
General Dynamics
Corporate headquarters
Bath Iron Works
Electric Boat (Groton and Quonset Point)
NASSCO
Hood Technology Corporation
The Insitu Group
JSA Partners, Inc.
L3 Communications, Ocean Systems
Litton Integrated Systems
Litton Ship Systems
Avondale Industries
Ingalls Shipbuilding
Lockheed Martin
Corporate headquarters
Naval Electronics and Surveillance Systems—Surface Systems
Space Systems
Logicon
Mercury Computer
Microsoft Corporation, Government Programs
MITRE Corporation
National Defense Industrial Association
Newport News Shipyard
Innovation Center
Virginia Advanced Shipbuilding and Carrier Integration Center
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Northrop Grumman
Analysis Center
Electronic Systems and Sensors Sector
Oceanic and Naval Systems
Sector headquarters
Integrated Systems Sector
Air Combat Systems
Unmanned Systems
Raytheon
Missile Systems
Naval and Maritime Systems
Research, Analysis and Engineering, Inc.
SAIC
Schafer Corporation
Solipsys
SYNTEK
Todd Pacific Shipyards
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List of Abbreviations
A AAW antiair warfare
ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
APL Applied Physics Laboratory
ASW antisubmarine warfare
C C4ISR command, control, communications, computer, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance
CEC Cooperative Engagement Capability
CNAN Capabilities Navy after Next
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
COP common operational picture
COTS commercial-off-the-shelf technologies
CVNX [future aircraft carrier program]
D DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DCI Defense Capabilities Initiative
DD(X) [multimission surface combatant program]
DoD Department of Defense
E EADS European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company
EBO effects-based operations
EC5G Expeditionary Command and Control, Communications,
Computers, and Combat Systems Grid
ESG expeditionary sensor grid
F FAR federal acquisition regulations
FFRDC federally funded research and development center
G GCS ground control station
GD General Dynamics
I ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IT information technology
IT-21 Information Technology for the Twenty-first Century
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LPD [amphibious transport, dock]
M MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
N NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASSCO National Steel and Shipbuilding Company
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVSEA Naval Sea Systems Command
NCO network-centric operations
NCW network-centric warfare
NFN Naval Fires Network
NMCI Navy–Marine Corps Intranet
NWDC Navy Warfare Development Command (Newport, R.I.)
O OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
OT&E operational test and evaluation
OTA Office of Technology Assessment
P PERT Program Evaluation and Review Technique
POET Phase One Evaluation Team
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R R&D research and development
RMA revolution in military affairs
RMP Radar Modernization Program
S S&T science and technology
SAGE Semi-Automatic Ground Environment
SAIC Science Applications International Corporation
SDI Strategic Defense Initiative
SDII SDI Institute
SEI Software Engineering Institute
SI systems integration
SOSUS Sound Surveillance System
SPAWAR Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
SRD Strategic Research Department (of the Naval War College
Center for Naval Warfare Studies)
STL Space Technology Laboratory
T TCN Tactical Component Network
TUAV tactical unmanned aerial vehicle
U UARC university applied research center
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
UCAV unmanned combat aerial vehicle
UGV unmanned ground vehicle
USN U.S. Navy
USV unmanned surface vehicle
UUV unmanned underwater vehicle
UV unmanned vehicle
W WeCAN Web Centric Anti-Submarine Warfare Net
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